2014年12月29日 星期一

香港學運領袖富二代周永康

http://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E5%AE%B6%E5%A2%83%E5%AF%8C%E8%A3%95%20%E5%91%A8%E6%B0%B8%E5%BA%B7%EF%B9%95%E6%9B%B4%E8%A6%81%E8%B5%B0%E5%87%BA%E4%BE%86-%E7%88%B6%E6%AF%8D%E6%96%99%E8%BA%AB%E5%AE%B6%E8%BF%91%E5%84%84%20%E4%BC%81%E6%A5%AD%E8%81%983600%E4%BA%BA/web_tc/article/20141229/s00002/1419789573814?fb_action_ids=10154927554735123&fb_action_types=og.comments

明報專訊】一場佔領運動,令學聯秘書長周永康成為政治新星。本報跟進及追查網上資料,發現平日形象樸素的他,原是全球聘用3600人的成衣企業的「太子爺」,家庭財產估計近1億元。
周永康接受本報專訪時承認自己是富家子,衣食無憂,但自言家境富裕反令他無後顧之憂,自覺更有責任貢獻社會,「有這種保護及支持,可以承受多些(壓力),無理由不走出來」。
佔領運動期間,周永康多是身穿T恤,天氣涼了便加上衛衣或薄羽絨,沒戴名牌眼鏡或手表,上周他接受本報專訪,穿了一件已起「毛粒」的連帽外套,背着一個殘舊的「多啦A夢」背包,難想像這個打扮樸實的年輕人家境頗富裕。
港持有4物業
運 動初期有人將「雙學三子」(學聯、學民、佔中三子)的家庭資料放上網,記者追查下,發現周的父母單計現時在本港持有的4個物業,市值最少6000萬元,還 未計他們在內地的製衣生意。記者上月中直擊周氏父母位於深圳龍崗區的製衣廠,現場所見,該層廠房佔地逾萬平方呎,當中數百呎設置了衣車用作製衣,當日有 10多名製衣工人上班,其餘地方用作辦公室,並放置服裝樣辦等。職員稱周氏夫婦身在美國公幹,又指他們很少到深圳廠房。記者同日前往其位於火炭的辦公室, 該處面積約300方呎,有兩名職員上班,職員亦稱周氏夫婦在美國,未知何時回港。..........

明報記者

萬幾呎廠房只有數百呎車間,周先生家裡這廠是總部,車間和十多名工人應是造樣辦的辦房,生產應已分判至第三世各地的血淚工廠。周先生家裡就像香港的地產霸 權一樣利用壓榨剝削第三世界工人階級來致富。周先生是依賴吸吮無產階級的血汗生存的社會寄生蟲,香港要靠一個土豪富二代寄生蟲來打救?這個明報還替他造神。香港人你們真是有 病!打倒一切資產階級牛鬼蛇神!全世界無產階級萬歲!

2014年12月27日 星期六

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第六章 緒戰3 法軍的判斷和部署

法軍的判斷和部署



1800年5月26日法預備集團軍主力,除了Chabran師還在 Fort Bard 前面解決阻礙法軍輜重通過的奧軍外,集中在 Ivrea,三萬二千人及八門大炮。

拿破侖再一次站在他人生路上的十字街頭。首席執政的人頭保不保得住就要看他下一步要怎樣走了。
從 Ivrea 有三條路可走。
第一條路是右轉直取都靈Turin,直接與Melas的奧軍主力決戰。
第二條路是直出中路取 亞歷山德利拉 Alessandria。
第三條路是左轉取米蘭 Milan。

拿破侖的所謂主力大部都是新兵,如果沒有大量火炮掩護,戰力成疑。目前不論糧食彈藥火炮都被卡在隘路,和Melas決戰勝算不高。
而且對方目前實力如何法軍並無把握只知道擋在都靈正面有奧軍一萬多,法南約三萬多兵和包圍著熱拿亞的兩萬兵,至於擋在瑞南各山隘出口則約有一萬兵。

這就是說都靈方面法軍三萬菜鳥在欠糧欠彈藥欠火炮下要對付三到四萬的正規奧軍。如果是日後的拿破侖他當然會先取都靈,但剛剛幾天前在隘路上他坐的騾子腳下的冰一滑,要不是身邊的嚮導一把拉住他這個首席執已經去了見路易十四了。今天他不願意再冒險。

取 Alessandria 則可解熱拿亞之圍及從其兵站奪得補給,但就要準備被 Ott 和 Melas 的向心攻擊或被 Melas 拊法軍腹背的 Ivrea。

取米蘭則除了奪取補給外還可以威脅守著從瑞士南下米蘭平原各隘口的奧軍為Moncey兵團南下米蘭製造條件。
從地圖上看我們不難看到由米蘭就可以一馬平川直取 Manuta 要塞截斷奧軍與奧地利本土的交通線。

當然攻取倫巴達首府米蘭還有一個好處是為首席執政取得解放意北人民的桂冠。首席執政正正急需這一個勝利來鞏固他的地位。
取米蘭這一路有一個問題就是會遠離 Ott 和 Melas, 給他們時間集中兵力。

權衡利害之後拿破侖決定向米蘭進軍。

法軍決心如下:
Lannes 軍向南驅逐奧軍至 Orco 河南岸及 Po 河南岸一線並佔領 Chivasso 及附近渡口。之後前出至 Pavia 掩護集團軍主力向米蘭的進軍。

預備集團軍主力經 Vercelli - Buffaloa 一線向米蘭前進,在米蘭與 Moncey 軍會合後向東南搜索奧軍主力決戰。

第七章:
http://mardephk.blogspot.hk/2015/01/blog-post.html






2014年12月19日 星期五

銀彈勁過核彈

石鏡泉少有的高質評論:
http://www.skypost.hk/column/%E7%9F%B3%E9%8F%A1%E6%B3%89/007003002016/%E9%8A%80%E5%BD%88%E5%8B%81%E9%81%8E%E6%A0%B8%E5%BD%88/164569 
銀彈勁過核彈
19/12/2014
今次俄盧布貶值,印證了中國領導層的一個擔心,就是國家金融系統的安全性,不遜於國家軍事系統的安全性。今時今日,無論你軍事力量有多強,仍不可以隨便扔核彈,但銀彈就可以隨意扔,而且可以直扔到敵方的大後方。
昨文講過六「子」琴魔,這六子都是聰明、知情、分析力一定好過我們的人。
前 美國國務卿基辛格謂歐洲在近來的外交事務上,與美國同一鼻孔出氣,日後可以會喪失了歐洲自己本身的話語權。這是個高技巧的忠告,事實上就是跟歐洲講,你幫 美國打垮了俄羅斯,即是以後美國再冇嘢要求你歐洲,屆時美國睬你都傻,你甚麼都要聽美國,這不是個好的外交,對外交家言,弱國要生存,最好是生存於兩個強 國之間,這兩強都要拉攏你,你就可以從中有自己的發言權,怎理解?


歐洲要靠俄國抗衡美國


聖誕來 了,一位女士如有兩位男友追,發達了,你想去吃中餐、西餐,都可以由女士話事,不是男士話事。唉!到你揀定了,結婚了,只得一個男士了,你估聖誕吃中餐、 西餐還會由女士話事?不會啦!老公會謂,人迫迫,去乜嘢外吃吖!你响屋企煮啦!食住家飯健康呀!於是浪漫聖誕不再,汗水聖誕就在,你還有話語權?明!
基辛格是外交家,Balancing Power Play,在國際中左右平衡、逢源,對今時軍事又唔得,經濟又唔得的歐洲言,是唯一生存之道。此即一個足以抗衡美國的俄羅斯,對歐洲最有利。
前蘇聯總理戈爾巴喬夫,這位被不少美國政要視為是可靠朋友的「敵人」,則於月前,在柏林圍牆倒下25周年的紀念會上,批評了美國對俄羅斯的行為和政策。戈爾巴喬夫的話,是英文的,我不譯了。
為 何筆者稱戈爾巴喬夫是美國可靠朋友的「敵人」這麼矛盾?在1989年前,美國跟蘇聯還是冷戰,大家都搞星戰計劃,但到了戈爾巴喬夫,他就跟美國 friend,1989年5月18日在中國學生佔領天安門期間,戈爾巴喬夫訪問中國,年紀輕的讀者不知道這兩個共產大國的首腦會面有甚麼含義,反正是共產 兄弟嘛!當然不是,因為當時中國和蘇聯是已斷交逾30年後,蘇聯首腦第一次訪中,他們會談講甚麼?沒多大公布,但大家總會醒覺,鬧了30年交,有過30年 邊境爭拗的敵人,突然來訪、做回朋友,你都知道必有大事。

戈氏全文:
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Gorbachevs-full-speech-during-the-celebrations-of-the-25th-Anniversary-of-the-Fall-of-the-Berlin-Wal
 

改革要循序漸進 不能心急

筆者當年就已 估,戈爾巴喬夫來華,告訴鄧小平,嗱,蘇聯要解體了,不撈共產主義了,結果就是於1989年11月,柏林圍牆倒下,東歐變天,有人謂是因為為89年6月4 日天安門事件,促成蘇聯解體,你看看日程就知這些人有幾無知。東歐變天是由6月4日至11月的不足半年內就可以變出來的嗎?而且大家也不要將注意力只放在 天安門,福建二炮部隊的火箭也由福建拉到北京,學生在福建瞓路軌,在南京長江大橋也瞓路軌去阻止這些火箭北上,學生運動搞到要出火箭?咁大陣仗?
趙 紫陽下台後,被定「罪」為分裂中央,他一定有做了某些事才有這「罪」名,筆者估其中可能是,趙紫陽改革心切,想學蘇聯一樣,一夜間唔撈共產,搞自由化,是 謂之Big Bang,這與鄧小平的摸着石頭過河的改革,穩定壓倒一切的改革是大相逕庭,但這不代表鄧小平不想改革,所以他在六四後有句話,「不能退,一退便沒有了共 產黨」,有人謂是對學生不能退讓,但筆者認為是「改革開放不能退」,事實上,在六四後,中國改革的步子更大,到習近平又是另一個改革了,在2013年習李 的工作報告中,就提出了59樣改革。
不少人會心急中國改革,希望一夜就可以將社會主義中不好的制度,事情一下子改好,這有點叫吸毒者三分鐘要戒毒一樣,理念偉大,但不可行,今時俄羅斯受制於美國(盧布大貶值)就是三分鐘戒毒的惡果。



保衞貨幣價值 經濟免被操控


每 個主權國家都要有自己貨幣,在今時國際金融上,國與國間的外滙交易,是要個Swift Code,才可完成,主宰這個Swift Code的是個民間機構,但可以受到歐美政治壓力,去取消某國的Swift Code,此即你的貨幣在國際間沒有兌匯能力,伊朗就是被取消了Swift Code的國家,最近英相卡梅倫就提出過要取消俄羅斯的Swift Code,亦入了歐洲議會的議程,但到今日為止,Swift Code這個機構謂不會踢俄羅斯出局,筆者昨文亦提出俄VTB銀行的頭頭Andrey Kostin謂,踢俄羅斯出Swift Code,等於宣戰(War)。
俄羅斯就是行這個Big Bang,一炮打散的改革將盧布一自由兌換就放,結果當盧布的認受性不足時,很易被美國用銀彈玩死。
一 直以來俄盧布有兩個主要外滙交易中心,一在倫敦,一在塞浦路斯銀行。今時俄盧布在倫敦很早幾乎已冇交易,因為你一舉一動美國都知,只在塞浦路斯銀行有大量 交易,在幾年前的希臘國債危機中,塞浦路斯銀行被迫到幾乎清盤,存戶只能拿回20%左右的存款,此中損失最大的是在塞浦路斯的俄與中國大戶,平白沒有了 80%的錢,這已是第一個銀彈勁過核彈。
中國見到此,學乖了,在人民幣出海時,是用百花齊放方式,倫敦、澳洲、新西蘭、日本、香港、新加坡、馬來 西亞等等地方都有,你美國佬要想用銀彈來炸我人民幣,你先搞好幾十個國家的串連啦!而且每地都是有個額度,由北京操控,不似俄盧布,換幾多都可以由攻擊者 操控,這就是循序漸進,穩定壓倒一切的部署。
不過,世界上有些人,是想中國行Big Bang,亦有些附和者,嫌中國改革太慢。唉!望望今日俄羅斯的困局,就知道,為甚麼阿爺一定要循序漸進,又一定要穩定壓倒一切,亦一定一定要一切都要在 可控中,不如此,只會遲早淪為美國的經濟殖民地。當然,有些飲可樂大的人,食老麥大的人不介意,但我是飲普洱,食飯大的,我不想中國有苦難的明天。
盧布、石油都是幌子,Swift Code是出血的刀,希望今日之後大家對世界政事,多份陰謀論的認識。為寫此文,看了百幾頁的資料,愈看愈覺得中國要走的路還真多。

延伸閱讀:介紹加拿大新左派作家 Naomi Klein 的 震撼主義—災難經濟的興起 這本書。書中對俄羅斯經濟在改朝換代初年實行新保守主義芝加哥學派的震撼治療有深入分析: http://www.books.com.tw/web/sys_serialtext/?item=0010439488  ,本書後半部份對以色列發展出的災難經濟觀更是中東亂局的另類解讀。

2014年12月14日 星期日

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第五章 緒戰2 奧軍的判斷和部署

奧軍的判斷和部署: 

  1800年5月22日 奧軍統帥Melas離開 法南Var河前線,25日抵達 Turin。26日,奧軍 Haddick 支隊被逐出在都靈北約三十公里的 Romano 高地,據前線報告,該敵為一從 Ivrea 方面南下之法軍,並確認拿破侖在此部隊中。同日奧軍法南Var一線攻勢再度受挫。
   從27至31日, 都靈西面 Susa 一線法軍幾次進攻皆被 Kaim 擊退。Melas 判斷都靈是法軍的目標。
    法南方面 Elsnitz 接到向熱拿亞後撤的命令後開始撤出 Var 河一線,但卻被 Suchet 從右翼包抄追擊。

     從 Melas 方面看目前的形勢,
Elsnitz 被逼後退,正從 Coni 方面向都靈後退。
Ott 則仍未能從熱拿亞脫身。
如果憑手上在都靈的兵力 (約 28000兵力) 向北找尋拿破侖主力決戰又怕法軍從西面  Susa 和南面 Coni 攻擊奧軍側背。奧軍如在都靈決戰,其交通線剛好與雙方進軍路線成直角,意味著拿破侖隨時可以切斷奧軍 Turin 與 Alessandria 間的補給線,逼奧軍經山區向熱拿亞撤退。Melas 決定先向 Alessandria 轉進,保障奧軍向熱拿亞或向 Manuta 要塞區運動的自由。

( 研究這段時期奧軍作戰指導時有一點要留意的是奧軍的補給機制很完善,當年有一個說法:前線的每一條 麵包都是由維也納前運的。這個良好補給機制亦造成奧軍對補給線的過度重視。往往變成掣肘奧軍行動自由的心理障礙。)

     5月31日, Melas 下達向 Alessandria 集中的命令。都靈部隊經 Asti 向 Alessandria 集中。法南部隊向 Coni轉進,掩護都靈主力向 Alessandria運動,再經 Asti 向 Alessandria 集中。熱拿亞 Ott 經 Novi 向 Alessandria 集中。熱拿亞方面要派出一個旅先遣隊佔領 Piacenza 渡口。都靈方面派出 O'Reilly 率一個旅護送兵團的炮兵預備隊前往 Piacenza 保障其渡口安全。

     奧軍部署如下圖:


第六章: http://mardephk.blogspot.hk/2014/12/3.html

2014年12月9日 星期二

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第四章 緒戰1

Allons Bataillons! 向意大利進發

    法國預備集團軍開始進軍。在大軍前面為了躲避伕役,居民紛紛避走,連運輸必備的騾子都徵不足數。由於大雪,大炮都要放在由樹幹造成的雪撬上由士兵拽進山。

    1800年5月17日 Lannes 佔領 Aosta。第三軍的 Chabran 師隨後抵達。第二天 Lannes 驅逐了在 Chatillon 的1千多克羅地亞部隊。拿破侖則留在 Martigny 催促輜重趕上大軍和安排瑞士盟軍保障法軍後方。

    5月19日,Lannes 前進到 Fort Bard 發覺這個碉堡建在一個峭壁上俯瞰著隘道。不獨如此,奧軍還將碉堡旁邊的村莊都有加強工事,法軍被逼停止前進。拿破侖進駐 Etroubles。

    同日在尼斯督戰的 Melas 接到法軍向瑞士集中的報告。但法軍五路進軍的報告很混亂,按常理法軍應會是為熱拿亞解圍,所以Melas 估計 Turreau 在 Susa 一路的軍隊是主力所在。Melas 立即命令由尼斯前線抽調兩個旅馳援在Turreau面前的Kaim。留下的部隊則由由 Elsnitz 指揮牽制著 Suchet 直至 熱拿亞陷落後立即經 Coni 北上向都靈集中。Haddick 部隊和從威尼斯增援的各部向都靈集中。

    法軍補給和大炮都被阻在 Fort Bard 前面。Berthier 曾經從旁邊山徑部署兩門山炮試圖炮擊它,但口徑太小起不到作用。步兵惟有由旁邊的山徑繞過它繼續前進。Berthier 花了兩天清除 Bard 周圍村莊的工事但大路仍然被碉堡控制著,就算想趁黑夜通過亦不成功。

    5月22日 Lannes 前出到山隘出口的 Ivrea 鎮。這個鎮有加強工事由 Haddick 的 2500兵力及 14門大炮駐守。Lannes 的部隊用刺刀花了兩小時將奧軍趕走,俘獲三百奧軍和全部大炮。
    Elsnitz 的奧軍在 Var 河一線的攻勢再一次被擊退。
    Turreau 同日將奧軍趕出 Susa,並向都靈前進。

    5月24日,Berthier 會合 Lannes。拿破侖則忙著安排第三軍的 Chabran 師圍攻 Fort Bard 意圖打通補給線。Berthier 從俘虜口中探到熱拿亞仍在法軍手中,Haddick 和五千奧軍在 Ivrea 南方約 10公里處,奧軍主將 Melas 5月23日被傳在都靈。Susa 方面的 Turreau並無消息。欠大炮欠彈藥的預備集團軍現在要決定
向南會合 Susa 方面的 Turreau 支隊
還是向東清除擋在即將起動的 Moncey 支隊進軍路線各隘路南方出口的奧軍。

    Melas 這一天在前往都靈途中收到幾千法軍通過 Fort Bard 的報告,他立即命令 Elsnitz 向熱拿亞的 Ott 部隊靠攏。

當日兩軍位置如下:

第五章:  http://mardephk.blogspot.hk/2014/12/2.html


   

2014年12月7日 星期日

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第三章 開局

十九世紀元年 法蘭西共和國首席執政決定向意大利進軍

 法蘭西共和國與反法同盟國的戰爭中上萊茵區是主戰場,南部戰線的意大利一向都是次要戰場。在督政府時期,意大利方面是由它自生自滅。由於缺乏糧餉加上因為營養不良引起的時疾,意大利集團軍光是由1799年11月至1800年2月就減員三份之二。拿破侖派Massena重整義大利集團軍。Massena 的任務是穩的住熱拿亞(Genoa)至尼斯(Nice)一線防止奧軍進出法國南部,並同時將奧軍主力吸引在熱拿亞為拿破侖進攻米蘭平原製造條件。


    從地圖看,整個意北平原都是被山嶺包圍。要進出意北就要穿過這些高山或是由尼斯沿地中海岸狹窄的道路進入。奧軍分在西面的都靈(Turin)和北面的米蘭(Milan)設兵站分別控制由法國及瑞士進入意北的通道。並在米蘭都靈中間橫跨意北的波河 (River Po)邊上亞歷山大利亞(Alessandria)設兵站與它們互為犄角。在Alessandria設兵站除了可以支援米蘭及都靈外更因為有數條道路可以通往熱拿亞和直抵熱拿亞,尼斯之間的海岸。是攻占熱拿亞和進入法南理想的基地。波河則方便由奧大利向意北的水路補給運輸。

    1800年1月25日拿破侖委任作戰部長Berthier組建並率領預備領集團軍,其作戰部長一職則由Carnot接掌。拿氏的計劃是在4月由萊茵集團軍先動手吸引住奧軍在上萊茵的兵力而預備集團軍則在萊茵和瑞士之間Kray,Melas 兩個兵團的接合部進入意北,之後南進包圍及殲滅Melas兵團。但因為法國萊茵集團軍的Moreau將軍一直在拖延,進攻時間表一直不能落實。

    就在法軍將帥角力之際奧軍Melas在意大利發難。前述Massena的部隊大幅減員加上部隊要分散各地就地徵糧,當奧軍進攻時根本不能集中兵力應付。Melas兵團在4月6日進攻Montenotte切斷熱拿亞和尼斯的聯系。4月7日奧軍成功將Massena約1萬兵壓迫在熱拿亞,而在約7千人左右的法軍則在Suchet將軍統率下向尼斯撤退。

    Berthier在4月18日抵預備集團軍的集中營地第戎(Dijon),發覺只有約3萬兵報到。

    4月20日2萬1千由Ott指揮的奧軍包圍熱拿亞。主帥Melas自率3萬奧軍沿著海岸向 Var河方向追擊Suchet。


    拿破侖決定不再等Moreau的配合,決定進軍。他一方面要求Massena盡量拖住奧軍,至少要在5月30日前熱拿亞都不能失守。而Suchet則要守住 Var河一線直至6月4日。另方面他派出副官從意大利邊境,瑞士各地的守備軍搜刮兵力。在戰史上很多時會見到守軍被圍到彈盡糧絕而援軍未到最後投降。近代日俄戰爭的旅順圍城戰,二戰的史太林格勒圍城戰,抗戰的衡陽保衛戰,常德會戰,內戰時期准海戰役等都是一例。很多時上級的指示是守至一兵一卒。這個是他的決心,但陣前的中下層官兵會怎麼想呢?拿氏這一個指定日期內死守的命令雖然結果是一樣,但在軍隊士氣上的影響卻不同,有日期指望大家可以一口氣挺下去,但無了期的死守則很多人沒有這個意志。

    Moreau 察覺到意大利的險情而且知道拿破侖已經起動,在4月25日越過萊茵河,連續半個月進攻Kray兵團並成功將奧軍逼退。但同時卻又要求將撥給預備集團軍守住瑞士南部的Moncey部隊歸還萊茵集團軍的建制。這個要求被作戰部長Carnot打回頭。不要說Moncey這個部隊早是協議劃歸預備集團軍,這個部隊人數不多而且遠離上萊茵就算歸還建制亦來不及參加對Kray兵團的進攻。
    在社會上很多時都會有Moreau這一種人,以為團體要靠他的實力聲望經驗,不理團隊合作精神,抗拒上司領導,不理團體利益,只顧自己利益擁兵自重,最後當然要付出代價。Moreau 後來就要為此付出代價,這是後話。

    從法瑞邊境進入意北要經過山區共有五條路線。
    Great St. Bernard 隘道這條路線的好處是大軍輜重可以經水路從法國內陸直抵日內瓦湖東岸的 Villeneuve 才進入山區。不好之處是山區道路狹窄。
     走 Little St. Bernard 隘道好處在山路較寬闊。但輜重補給只能陸運,以目前法軍後勤幾乎等如零的陸路運輸能力來說可以不用考慮。
    其它經 Simplon, St. Godhard 及 Splugen 三個隘道的進軍路線對法軍來說都是太遠。
    另外由 Mount Cenis 經 Susa 的路線經過山區較少,但因為一出山隘就是都靈,可以直接解熱拿亞之圍,奧軍早有準備,已分兵1萬由Kaim 守著山隘出口 Susa 至都靈一線。
    
    拿破侖和Berthier商定大軍主力約5萬人由Geneva 經Great St. Bernard 隘道進軍。
由南至北的部署是

1. Turreau 約 2400 兵力由  Mt. Cenis 經 Susa 向 Ivrea 進發和主力會合,Tureau 回報5月21日可以進軍。
2. 第三軍一部 Chabron 6500兵力經 Little St. Bernard 隘道佯進並在 Aosta 與大軍會合。
3. 預備集團軍主力經 Great St. Bernard 隘道進軍。
4. Moncey 軍的 Bethencourt 支隊約1000兵力由 Simplon 隘路向奧軍各哨站積極佯攻製造有大軍團開進的假象。
5. Moncey 軍約1萬1千人向 St. Gothard 隘路北邊入口集中製造向米蘭方面進軍的壓力。但由於運輸和補給問題,Moncey 軍只能在 5月21日派出2千8百人先動,主力要在5月尾才能進軍。

    4月30日 Ott 突擊 熱拿亞城 被打退。 
    5月9日拿破侖抵達日內瓦會合預備集團軍。5月13日會齊輜重後預備集團軍由日內瓦湖東進軍。由Lannes(朗尼)統率的第一軍為前鋒進入山區。同日Massena在熱拿亞突圍,但失敗 Soult 被俘。
    5月14日Melas 進抵 Var 河東岸與 Suchet 對峙。由Lannes(朗尼)統率的第一軍作為預備集團軍前鋒開始進入山區。

    擋在預備集團軍主力面前的是奧軍 Kaim 兵團 Haddick 支隊的 7400名克羅地亞部隊。這支部隊據守在 Aosta 至 Ivrea 一線的隘路。

    5月17日,Lannes 將佔據 Aosta 的克羅地亞部隊趕走。這個大小聖班納隘道接合點拿下了。拿破侖幾乎一敗塗地的 Marengo 戰役正式開始了。

    


    

2014年12月1日 星期一

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第二章 作戰計劃

    公元1799年11月18日拿破侖成為法國臨時政府首席執政。
    拿氏就任後首先要做的是向反法同盟提出和談。從政治上看法國政府被政棍弄到停擺,經濟民生軍隊都陷入無政府狀態,法國像一個爛透的柿子隨時四分五裂。從軍事上看法軍主力的萊茵集團軍正在上萊茵至瑞士北境和兵力大致相同的奧地利 Kray 兵團對峙,但意大利集團軍卻被具數倍兵力的 Melas 兵團力壓,法軍很快就會頂不住。你拿破侖憑什麼可以說服人家坐下來談?拿破侖對此心知肚明,所以亦作出兩手準備。

    公元1800年1月25日,坐上首席執政這個座位兩個月零七天的拿氏下令作戰部長Berthier組建並領導一個有6萬兵力的預備集團軍向第戎 ( Dijon ) 集中。同盟國第一時間從間諜中知道這個集團軍的組建。但因為軍隊給養系統還未恢復,預備集團軍要分散成小單位在第戎大範圍內各地就地徵糧及宿營,根本不像有重兵集中,加上從各地徵召的新兵,不論軍紀裝備都亂糟糟,所以同盟國推斷這個所謂的預備集團軍只是虛張聲勢想牽制奧軍來替義大利集團軍減少壓力。

    同盟國的計劃很簡單,就是在由奧軍在萊茵一線採取守勢牽制住法軍及由英軍在大西洋沿岸派兵騷擾,而同時則主力攻取熱拿亞 (Genoa),得到熱拿亞後利用其港口與英國海軍聯合沿岸西進攻取法國海軍地中海母港土倫 (Toulon)。當法軍從萊茵一線抽調兵員增援南線時萊茵方面的Kray兵團就轉守為攻直指巴黎。


    法軍原本是計劃由拿破侖指揮預備集團軍及萊茵集團軍由萊茵河上遊彎曲部 Schaffhausen出擊。將 Kray兵團和 Melas 兵團的聯系打斷,之後拿破侖指揮預備集團軍南下聯合意大利集團軍打破Melas兵團,而Moreau則揮軍追擊 Kray 兵團。但 Moreau 將軍寧願辭職都不願接受拿破侖的指揮。鑒於 Moreau 在軍政界的聲望首席執政亦拿他沒法。


    商議到最後是由萊茵集團軍分出2萬5千兵力守住瑞士南部與意大利的邊境山峽要衝。再由萊茵集團軍進攻Kray兵團南翼。到攻勢有進展後,拿破侖率預備集團軍聯合Moreau留在瑞士南部的2萬5千兵力越過山峽南下米蘭 (Milan)平原解放意大利集團軍。
    萊茵一線法奧軍力相等都在10萬多左右,如果分出2萬5千兵給拿破侖,Moreau 拿著只有對方四份三的軍力還要去攻擊,正常人都不會幹吧。
    但前線並不會等你慢慢扯皮。一入春暖意大利方面立刻就出現險情了。

第三章:
http://mardephk.blogspot.hk/2014/12/blog-post.html

2014年11月30日 星期日

拿破侖 馬靈高戰役 第一章-戰前形勢


馬靈高 ( Marengo ) 戰役是拿破侖主政後第一個戰役,拿破侖的政治生涯幾乎在這裡劃上句號。

(為免譯音錯誤地名和人名會沿用英文。)

戰前形勢

   公元1799年 拿破侖的埃及遠征在英國取得地中海的制海權後不只變成雞肋而且除了搜刮到大量的考古文物外遠征軍看不到前途。拿破侖要在遠征拖累他的民望前和在英國海軍完 全封鎖埃及前離開埃及。所以當他收到英俄荷奧等國組成的第二次反法聯盟的聯軍攻打法國的消息時便藉機跑回法國希望能在第二次反法聯盟戰爭中撈到一點政治本錢。
    實際上法國的軍事形勢並非太差。法軍和聯軍互有 攻守。俄國更因為和奧地利在瑞士意大利方面的作戰指導發生爭論最後拉隊回國。法軍和反法聯軍雙方暫時相持在荷蘭上萊茵意大利一線。
     1799年8月22日拿破侖乘軍艦離開埃及。
     1799年10月9日,拿破侖在Toulon登岸。

   當時大革命後的法國政局混亂,督政府貪污無能,人民拒絕服從督政府的政令。五百人立法議會為了立威處處和督政府對抗。政府施政寸步難行,一切政治改革的立法全部被立法議會打回頭。在往首都途中作戰部長就曾對拿破侖報告法軍已經有四個月都收不到被服糧餉彈藥武器了。政府對軍隊已經放手不理。
    督政府內除了雅各賓派和復辟派之外還有改革派。改革派為了打破僵局一直想找一個有實力的軍人做後盾但沒有人有興趣個這渾水。拿破侖的出現給了他們一個希望。改革派大老們想招攬拿氏加入政府,利用拿氏的聲望壓制議會以便推行改革。
    剛好當時巴黎的衛戍部隊有很多都是拿破侖在意利統率過的老兵,拿破侖在得到巴黎警察總長的支持後 召集舊部解散了督政府並成立一個三人的臨時政府。立法議會議員們在拿破侖士兵的刺刀大力鼓勵下投票通過新憲法。
    1799年11月9日在回國三十二天後29歲的拿破侖成為法國臨時政府 的首席執政。
    改革派政客的如意算盤是武力解散督政府後就將拿破侖架空,但槍桿子出政權,三人政府其它兩個執政很快就成為首席執政的政治花瓶了。法國人民經過大革命後的恐怖統治和之後的政治混亂已經對政治非常厭倦,大家都希望有強人出來恢復社會秩序。而民眾對 拿氏的軍功和強硬手段印象不錯所以並沒有多大反抗,反而軍隊方面反對聲音較多。
  拿破侖著手重訂憲法,將金融回復健康發展,恢復法治和社會秩序,建設地方政府,重組軍隊準備來春的戰鬥。歐洲的大陸法就是起源於拿破侖在這半年間所訂定的 拿破侖法典。可以想象如果不是六個月而是有六年和平的時間給拿破侖主政,歐洲以至全世界今天會是一個怎樣的世界。但歷史沒有如果。將法國由無恥的政棍議會中 解救出來後,法國要反守為攻,歐洲正式開始了由君主政治向民族主義的過渡,世界從此再不一樣了。

     公元1800年,十 九世紀的第一年,法國的處境,無論在政治上或在軍事上都很嚴峻。第二次反法同盟對拿破侖的和談建議毫不理會。旺代 ( Vendee )地區在英國及法國保皇黨的煽動下暴亂再起。法國只有荷蘭,西班牙和瑞士這三個心不甘情不願的盟國。法海軍被困在馬爾他,拿氏在意大利起家的嫡系部隊三萬多人都被英海軍封鎖圍在埃及,早晚要向英軍投降。
    在歐洲大陸的法軍按編制有28萬人,但之前的無政府狀態下開小差跑剩15萬 兵。

雙方開局的軍事形勢:

    在上萊茵河及瑞士北方奧軍Kray將軍有10萬8千兵和法國Moreau將軍萊茵集團軍的10萬4千兵對峙。
    在意大利奧軍有13萬兵和在Massena麾下的3 萬多法軍對峙。
    在荷蘭,有2萬5千法軍在防止英國從海上突襲。

    拿破侖知道他的首席執政地位並不是八風吹不動的。只是他剛好因利乘便檢回來的,在軍中比他有名聲有實力的將領多的是,之前大家都不動是怕民意反彈和政棍扯後腿,搞不好幾天就被民眾的街壘轟下台兼被判叛國殺頭。但經拿破侖的示範,原來這麼容易就可以奪權成功。現在只要其中任何一個 將領有興趣這首席執政的椅子,都可取而代之。而對抗反法同盟的主力,萊茵集團軍的Moreau將軍對拿氏的威脅最大。他卓有戰功資歷老,手握重兵,更重要的是他根本看不起拿破侖這個首席執政。拿破侖要站穩腳就只能指望得到人民的支持,沒有什麼比再為法國公民帶來一次勝利更有效。

    在這個指導思想之下拿破侖開始行動。但怎樣部署呢?

    先前的無政府狀態軍隊的後勤全部停擺。在拿氏能重建軍隊補給系統前,除了防守直接威脅到法國安全的萊茵地區Moreau的部隊外其它法軍只能暫時就地徵糧,就地籌餉了。同樣理由,徵召入伍的新兵只有三份一報到入伍。

    主戰場在瑞士北部至巴登 ( Baden ) 萊茵河岸由萊茵集團軍防守是Moreau的本錢亦是抵抗奧地利的主力根本動不得。南方在意大利Massena的意大利集團軍正被優勢之敵壓逼在熱拿亞,自顧不暇。

    拿破侖自不然想到他發跡的地方——意北平原。

第二章:
http://mardephk.blogspot.hk/2014/11/blog-post_15.html
    

黑幫借遊行收保護費

旺角暴民昨日在一金舖前高叫溝污口號店家被逼關門,今日就在一金舖及一藥房門口高叫溝污口號。明天可能又再多幾間店舖受害。再過多幾日可能有人會同各店舖 講想不再向你店叫口號每日要付容忍費若干。各傻仔在人家店口附和高叫以為好過癮,但實際上不知不覺變成黑社會幫兇!邊個係黑社會?帶頭向店舖叫口號的人就 是。

2014年11月22日 星期六

人多口疏

蘋果日報11月21日報導:
【本報訊】近日屢受圍罵的金鐘主台,是糾察杜志權連夜露宿之地。近兩個月來他不睡帳篷,只套上睡袋,以便隨時起來應付突發事件。醉酒佬、藍絲帶、黑社會, 阿權都應付過,但最叫他擔心的,是日前衝擊立會的蒙面「同路人」。

「為衝而衝會失民心」

42歲的阿權為這場運動準備已久,去年參與商討日,大半年前辭去貨車司機工作,全情投入「去飲」,只因支持戴耀廷的理念,「諗住就算飲得一兩日,都可能有 手尾跟,如法律程序啦,唔想吓吓同老細請假」。太太與兒子在職,全力支持,令他安心投入運動。
早在9.22大專生在中大發動罷課,他與太太一起已 到場支援,最初到處執垃圾,後來不時獨自巡邏,見有事端就上前調停,兩周前被郭紹傑邀請加入糾察隊。阿權說,運動早期最擔心警察開槍,但政府現採拖延戰 術,相信不會開火。他也擔心黑社會伺機生事,早前有十多名疑似黑社會分子,一連三日「巡視」金鐘,他就跟足三日,「到最後有個阿哥話:唔使咁跟啩,大佬叫 我哋嚟保護學生箒」,之後就再出現。醉漢鬧事,藍絲帶踩場,愛字頭挑釁,大陸人撕海報,他見怪不怪。「呢啲明刀明槍,就明擋囉,好易處理,最難搞係啲背景 成疑嘅自稱同路人,口講民主,但又要踢走自己人」。
前日凌晨,那群圍罵大台、衝擊立會的「口罩友」,阿權認為比黑社會更令他擔心,「佢哋講唔出衝嘅目的,下下要行動升級,但夠人至得㗎,𠵱家係升級變降級,為衝而衝會失民心,民望係最重要㗎」。
阿 權認為有必要有大會與大台,「冇組織就唔係運動,係無政府狀態,唔會因此就冇紛爭,只會鬥大聲鬥惡」。再者,大台可聚眾,「太多小組易起紛爭,只會做死糾 察」。他續稱,糾察在功能是維持秩序,「確保現場係和平非暴力,每個人都可以自由參與。其實唔鍾意大台,可以喺旁邊起一壇,大家鍾意就會埋去聽,好多團體 都做緊,但點解要我哋唔講畀你講晒?」

http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20141121/18942696 

若要人不知除非己莫為。香港反政府勢力借佔中運動搞局,花鉅款找黑幫撐場兼做苦肉計自己衝擊自己。雖然佔中一方一直否認有勾結黑幫,但卻被自己人口多多洩密

2014年11月6日 星期四

會計界議員梁繼昌白癡評赤臘角機場空管


梁繼昌是會計界功能組別議員。梁議員在2014年10月15日在信報引用中大幾年前有關香港機場空中交通控制的研究報告,引申攻擊港府不敢向中方爭取開放內地低空空域。中大研究全文見下面連結

http://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/research/aprc/activities/files/AirSpace.pdf



要注意梁議員曾捲入立法會議員攜同親友接受國泰航空公司免費超豪歐遊醜聞。

梁議員全文如下
又到我在信報專欄〈專業為公〉的時間了!今個星期與大家談「空牆」。
「空牆」是指,內地軍方對本港進出航班所實施的航空管制
。我在文章指出,當局要向公眾交代「空牆」對本地航空交通流量的影響,否則難以說服市民支持發展「三跑」。
全文如下:

//現時有關香港國際機場興建第三條跑道(下稱「三跑」)的爭議中,在環保和生態因素之外,另一個爭議重點是現時進出中國空域的高度限制(俗稱「空牆」),對香港的航班升降量和進出航道的影響。如果當局未能全面向公眾交代「空牆」對本地航空交通流量的影響,實未能說服香港市民「三跑」對香港的長遠發展有何益處,並將在往後的社會討論中引起更大爭議。

「空牆」是指中國內地軍方對本港進出航班所實施的航空管制。在「空牆」的影響下,現時香港航班須要爬升至15700呎才可以進出香港空域,由於民航客機不能於短時間內加速爬升至上述高度,因而在進出內地空域前需採取一條較迂迴的向南航道繞圈,以確保飛機有足夠時間爬升。

值得留意的是,1992年公布的新機場規劃總綱中原先規劃香港以北的空域作飛機進場和離場之用,但機場落成至今,相關的航道仍未啟用。有意見指出,增加向北的航道,能令離港航機更快地進入內地空域,從而減少在香港上空盤旋和繞圈的時間。故此,當局有必要向社會交代現時向北空域未能使用的原因,而向北航道未能如計劃般運作,又是否與現時「空牆」的限制有關?

「空牆」除了有機會對香港可使用的空域造成限制外,亦會對現時以高度分隔航機飛行的航空交通管理造成影響。一般民航客機的進場和離場高度層大約在25000呎以下,但由於「空牆」因素把香港進入內地的空域限制至15700 呎,明顯局限了香港航班進場和離場時可使用的空域,導致飛機不能使用較低的高度進入內地空域,因而限制了香港機場的實際航班處理量。

其實,「空牆」問題並非一件新鮮事,亦非只有民間才提出質疑。2007 年11 月8 日《明報》的一篇報道中,已曾引述當時國泰航空行政總裁陳南祿的說法,指香港機場航運擠塞嚴重,而進入內地空域的高度限制影響空運效率,應盡快解除,否則興建「三跑」亦屬徒然。同時,陳南祿亦估計每班航機在解除「空牆」限制後,可節省25分鐘的繞圈時間,並同時節省燃油和減少污染。如果有航空公司高層多年前已提出相同關注,是否進一步引證社會對「空牆」問題的質疑,值得當局重視和回應呢?

現時政府和機管局就興建第三條跑道所提出的論點,仍有很多不確定因素。尤其在空域管理的問題上,社會掌握的資料和討論仍然不足。筆者同意空運業對香港經濟發展的重要,但對一個耗資千億的工程,我們應該對項目的實質限制和環境影響,進行充分討論,以確保公帑運用能符合社會整體利益。//



                                                 香港空域概要圖 (取自上述中大報告)

下面是梁議員向港府質詢有關機場的文件:
LCQ14: Air traffic movements at the Hong Kong International Airport
************************************************************
     Following is a question by the Hon Kenneth Leung and a written reply by the Secretary for Transport and Housing, Professor Anthony Cheung Bing-leung, in the Legislative Council today (October 15):
Question:

     It has been reported recently that quite a number of flights have been delayed in taking off from or landing at the Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) due to the implementation of air traffic flow control by the mainland authorities. There have also been press comments pointing out that the People's Liberation Army Air Force requires that an aircraft departing from Hong Kong must reach an altitude of over 15 700 feet before it enters the mainland airspace (such altitude restriction is commonly known as the "sky wall"). The sky wall has lengthened flight times and prevented the existing two-runway system of HKIA from optimising its operation efficiency, thus affecting air traffic movements. Besides, some concern groups have recently pointed out that the northbound routes recommended in the 1992 New Airport Master Plan have still not been opened. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the number of times the Airport Authority or the Civil Aviation Department was notified by the mainland authorities of the implementation of air traffic flow control (broken down by mainland airspace over which air traffic flow control is implemented) and the total number of hours of delay in aircraft arrivals and departures caused by such control since 2010;

(2) of the number of flights which were delayed in taking off from or landing in Hong Kong due to the implementation of air traffic flow control by the mainland authorities, with a breakdown of the number by flight destinations and its percentage in the total number of aircraft movements, in each year since 2010, set out in Table 1;

(3) whether it conducted any study in the past three years on the effects of the "sky wall" on the number of aircraft movements; if so, of the details; if not, whether the authorities can undertake to conduct the study and publish the results; and

(4) of the reasons why the northbound air routes have still not been opened?

下面是官方答案:
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201410/15/P201410150241.htm


Reply:

President,

     Our reply to the various parts of the Hon Kenneth Leung's question is as follows:

(1) and (2) The Civil Aviation Department (CAD) has been monitoring closely the situation of delayed departure flights for the Mainland. The statistics from 2010 to September 2014 are set out in Table 2.

     Separately, CAD does not have any breakdown on airspace control implemented by the Mainland or on the destinations of the delayed flights, nor the statistics regarding delayed arrival flights from the Mainland.

(3) To make sure that aircraft in adjacent airspaces could operate in a safe and efficient manner, an aircraft must reach a certain altitude before an air traffic control (ATC) unit may hand over the control in respect of that aircraft to another ATC unit. This is to ensure that when aircraft in adjacent airspaces fly in opposite directions, they could keep flying at different altitudes to prevent collisions. This air traffic management arrangement for flights to be separated by altitudes seeks to safeguard flight safety, and is commonly applied by busy airports all over the world, including those in London and New York.  This arrangement has no direct relationship with the time interval and space separation between runway movements, and hence does not affect runway capacity.


Given the close proximity between Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) and its Shenzhen counterpart and the fact that the two airports are separately managed by two ATC units in Hong Kong and the Mainland, an aircraft departing from HKIA must reach the designated handover altitude of 15 700 feet before it can enter the Mainland's airspace.  This designated altitude requirement is also applicable to aircraft flying from the Mainland into Hong Kong's airspace. After discussing with the Mainland's ATC unit, the two sides have since 2005 lowered the handover altitude from 15 700 feet to 12 800 feet during specified non-peak hours at night (that is, from 11pm to 7am the following day), thereby minimising detours made by aircraft.

(4) In accordance with the international standards and recommendations promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the development of flight paths should take into account the terrain environment, runway alignment, the prescribed obstacle clearances, airspace coordination with nearby airports, and so on.

     Due to the constraints presented by the high mountains around HKIA, and after giving due consideration to the relevant factors above, the two runways of HKIA are operating under an independent segregated mode of operations (that is, the North Runway is used exclusively for arrivals and the South Runway exclusively for departures), and it is not necessary to use flight paths north of the airport under this mode of operations.

     According to a runway capacity analysis for HKIA in 2008 conducted by the UK aviation consultant, the National Air Traffic Services, which is commissioned by the Airport Authority Hong Kong, the practical maximum capacity that can be achieved by the two runways of HKIA is 68 movements per hour. Over the years, through continuous improvements to flight procedures and operations, and efforts to optimise airspace structure as well as to increase the manpower of air traffic controllers and upgrade infrastructural facilities at the airfield, the CAD has gradually increased the capacity of the two runways in accordance with air traffic demand, from 50 movements per hour in 2004 to the current 65 movements per hour. The CAD will continue to further increase the capacity of the two runways to their practical maximum capacity of 68 movements per hour in 2015.

Ends/Wednesday, October 15, 2014
Issued at HKT 12:30

2014年11月5日 星期三

Takeoff and landing separation of A380

Takeoff and landing separation of A380


In 2005, the ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization recommended that provisional separation criteria for the A380 on takeoff[214] and landing be substantially greater than for the 747 because preliminary flight test data suggested a stronger wake turbulence.[215][216] These criteria were in effect while the ICAO's wake vortex steering group, with representatives from the JAA, Eurocontrol, the FAA, and Airbus, refined its 3-year study of the issue with additional flight testing. In September 2006, the working group presented its first conclusions to the ICAO.[217][218]
In November 2006, the ICAO issued new interim recommendations. Replacing a blanket 10 nautical miles (19 km) separation for aircraft trailing an A380 during approach, the new distances were 6 nmi (11 km), 8 nmi (15 km) and 10 nmi (19 km) respectively for non-A380 "Heavy", "Medium", and "Light" ICAO aircraft categories. These compared with the 4 nmi (7.4 km), 5 nmi (9.3 km) and 6 nmi (11 km) spacing applicable to other "Heavy" aircraft. Another A380 following an A380 should maintain a separation of 4 nmi (7.4 km). On departure behind an A380, non-A380 "Heavy" aircraft are required to wait two minutes, and "Medium"/"Light" aircraft three minutes for time based operations. The ICAO also recommends that pilots append the term "Super" to the aircraft's callsign when initiating communication with air traffic control, to distinguish the A380 from "Heavy" aircraft.[219]
In August 2008, the ICAO issued revised approach separations of 4 nmi (7.4 km) for Super (another A380), 6 nmi (11 km) for Heavy, 7 nmi (13 km) for medium/small, and 8 nmi (15 km) for light.[220] In November 2008, an incident on a parallel runway during crosswinds made the Australian authorities change procedures for those conditions.[221]

A brief introduction to the effect of wake turbulence of aircraft and international regulation of separation between takeoffs.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wake_turbulence

2014年11月4日 星期二

來港未滿七年可申綜援,終院判詞

全世界只有香港的終審法院法官可以由外國人擔任,而且可以是不吃人間煙火。本案申請人後來更被揭發在廣州有物業,並有兩名兒子供養,並非其訛稱的孤苦零丁。可謂貪得無厭。

來港未滿七年可申請綜援上訴終審庭案,由上訴人孔允明向法援署指定的代表律師:
資深大律師陳文敏先生及大律師潘熙先生(由法律援助署指派、鄧王周廖成利律師行延聘)代表上訴人孔允明。
廖成利係民協,
協助孔婦申請法援的蔡耀昌係民主黨,
陳文敏係港大法律系教授,即是戴耀廷老細。

當然上述律師是否 涉及包攬訴訟 在法律上是非常清晰:是沒有的。
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=90670&currpage=T

FACV No. 2 of 2013
IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
FINAL APPEALNO. 2 OF 2013 (CIVIL)
(ON APPEAL FROM CACV NO. 185 OF 2009)
_______________________
Between :
KONG YUNMING (孔允明) Appellant
and
THE DIRECTOR OF SOCIAL WELFARE Respondent
_______________________
Before: Chief Justice Ma, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ,Mr Justice Tang PJ, Mr Justice Bokhary NPJ,Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers NPJ
Dates of Hearing: 18-19 November 2013
Date of Judgment: 17 December 2013
________________________
J U D G M E N T
________________________

Chief Justice Ma:
1. For the reasons contained in the Judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, this appeal must be allowed.  The Government’s policy, which came into effect on 1 January 2004 requiring all recipients of Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) to have been a Hong Kong resident for at least seven years, is not constitutional.
Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ:
2. In this appeal, it falls to the Court to consider the scope and effect of the right to social welfare conferred upon Hong Kong residents by Article 36 of the Basic Law.  It arises in the context of the applicant’s claim for benefits under the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (“CSSA”) Scheme.
A.  The appellant’s circumstances
3. The appellant (“Madam Kong”) is a native of Guangdong.  She had previously been married but divorced her first husband in 1983.  There were two sons of that marriage and they reside on the Mainland. In 2001, she met Mr Chan Wing, a Hong Kong permanent resident, and married him in October 2003, having visited him in Hong Kong on a two-way permit on several occasions.  Mr Chan was not a man of means.  His health was not good and he had been a recipient of social welfare since 1985.
4. Madam Kong worked on the Mainland as a home helper for the elderly until 2005.  She was unable thereafter to find work and, when granted a one-way permit (“OWP”) by the Chinese authorities on 30 November 2005, she decided to come to settle in Hong Kong with her husband. She arrived here on 21 December 2005, then aged 56, and was granted permission to remain for seven years.  She thereupon became a non-permanent resident of Hong Kong within the meaning of Article 24 of the Basic Law.[1]
5. Sadly, her husband (who was aged 76) died on 22 December 2005, the day after she arrived in Hong Kong.  In consequence, she found herself homeless, since the Housing Authority immediately repossessed her late husband’s public housing unit.  She was without family or friends in Hong Kong and was admitted to a shelter for street sleepers.
6. On 20 March 2006, Madam Kong applied for CSSA but was unsuccessful.   Her application was refused because the Government’s policy has, since 1 January 2004, been that persons who have resided in Hong Kong for less than seven years do not qualify for CSSA, save where, in exceptional circumstances, the Director of Social Welfare (“the Director”) waives that residence requirement as a matter of discretion.  The policy was aimed at Mainland immigrants.  Madam Kong’s case was not considered appropriate for the exercise of that discretion and her appeal to the Social Security Appeal Board against that decision was rejected.
B.  The decisions of the Courts below
7. She was granted legal aid and instituted judicial review proceedings to challenge the Director’s decision to reject her CSSA application on the ground that the imposition of the seven-year residence requirement is inconsistent with Articles 25, 36 and 145 of the Basic Law, as well as Article 22 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights.[2]
8. On 23 June 2009, Mr Justice Andrew Cheung (as Mr Justice Cheung CJHC then was) dismissed her application for judicial review.[3]  His Lordship’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.[4]
C.  The CSSA scheme
C.1  The nature and purpose of CSSA
9. The CSSA scheme is a non-contributory, means-tested social security scheme.  It is administered by the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”) and is non-statutory.  The Government describes it as “a means-tested safety-net benefit designed to ensure that people with limited or no other sources of income have sufficient money to meet their basic needs.”[5]  It aims in particular to provide “a safety net for individuals or families who are unable to support themselves financially because of age, disability, illness, low earnings, unemployment or family circumstances.”[6]
10. As Mr Cheung Doi-ching,[7] giving evidence on the Government’s behalf, explains, the basic needs “include food, clothing, fuel and light, rent and schooling expenses for children ...”  The Director sets a level of income which represents the amount required to meet these essential needs and:
“The difference between the total assessable monthly income of a family and its total monthly needs as recognised under the Scheme in terms of various types of payment will be the amount of assistance payable.”[8]
C.2  The evolution of the residence requirement
11. At the end of World War II, with China in the throes of a civil war, Hong Kong experienced a massive influx of refugees which brought the post-war population of about 600,000 in 1945 up to 1,600,000 at the end of 1946.  The population increased to 2,500,000 in 1956 and reached over 3,000,000 by March 1960.[9]
12. It was against that background that the Social Welfare Office was established in 1948, providing rudimentary relief in kind, primarily in the form of cooked meals for the relief of refugees.  As welfare assistance evolved, a residence requirement of 10 years was established as a condition of eligibility for public assistance.[10] In 1958, the SWD was formed and it provided shelter for the destitute and continued to provide relief in the form of daily cooked meals and dry rations.[11]  A year later, in 1959, the residence requirement was reduced to five years.
13. The inadequacies of the system were recognized in a report on “Aspects of Social Security” prepared by an Interdepartmental Working Party in April 1967, and in March 1970, a Memorandum for the Executive Council[12] pointed out that the then existing scheme:
“... does not enable the need to be met adequately in a substantial proportion of cases. To some extent this is because the levels of assistance are too low. Mainly, however, this is because the form in which assistance is normally given, namely dry rations, takes no account of either the basic household needs required to maintain a minimum standard of living, or the special needs arising from any particular disability suffered by a member of a family.”
14. The Memorandum recommended a change of policy, arguing that “the stage of development now reached by Hong Kong justifies a more liberal policy, and one which more closely meets the needs of the indigent” and that, as the Working Party had recommended, “public assistance, in the form of financial aid, should be accepted as a responsibility of the Government to be met by public funds” with the aim of relieving the destitute. It proposed substituting cash grants on a means-tested basis for assistance in kind.  It is of particular present relevance that it also proposed that the residence requirement be reduced to one year:
“The second proposal is that the present criterion of a minimum period of five years’ residence in the Colony should be reduced to one year, with the discretion of the Director of Social Welfare to pay assistance to people who have not fulfilled this condition, if, in their particular circumstances, he considers it necessary having regard for other available sources of aid. The residential criterion was established in 1948 at 10 years and reduced in 1959 to 5 years. The thinking behind the residential qualification was that public assistance should not be made so freely available as to attract a mass influx of new immigrants from China into the Colony. As a result, voluntary agencies, including some which are subvented by Government, have necessarily had to assume the responsibility for assisting persons who do not have this residential qualification. The situation regarding immigration has changed considerably in recent years and it is believed that this residential qualification could safely be reduced to one year, although for reasons associated with our external relations it would be possibly unwise at the present time to remove it entirely.”[13]
15. As pointed out by Ms Polly Choy Bo Chun[14] on the Government’s behalf, the Governor-in-Council endorsed those recommendations on 17 March 1970 and the Legislative Council’s Finance Committee approved the necessary funding on 17 June 1970.  The system then put in place developed into the present CSSA scheme which was introduced in its present form with effect from 1 July 1993.
16. From 1970 onwards, one year’s residence was the residential condition of eligibility for the benefit.  It was only on 1 January 2004 that the new requirement was adopted, resulting in Madam Kong having to wait seven years before qualifying for CSSA.  I shall return later to examine the terms upon which the seven-year requirement was introduced and the Government’s justification for its introduction.
D.  The constitutional provisions relied on by Madam Kong
17. By Article 36, the Basic Law provides:
“Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in accordance with law. The welfare benefits and retirement security of the labour force shall be protected by law.”
18. It must be read together with Article 145 of the Basic Law which states:
“On the basis of the previous social welfare system, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and social needs.”
19. The focus of this appeal is on the right to “social welfare in accordance with law” as laid down by those two Articles.
20. The case as argued below centred on the right to equality before the law and protection against discrimination.  Thus, reliance was primarily placed on Article 25 of the Basic Law which provides that “All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law”; and on Article 22 of the Bill of Rights which states:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”[15]
21. Professor Johannes Chan SC, who appeared[16] for Madam Kong did not abandon the case based on equality, but submits that the central complaint involves the Government’s adoption of the seven-year requirement, whether framed as a contravention of Article 25 or of Article 36.  Pursuing the case under Article 36 has the advantage of dispensing with proof of the element of discrimination.  If, as Madam Kong submits, it was an infringement of her right to social welfare under Article 36 for the Government to introduce the seven-year residence restriction, her challenge succeeds without her having to show that she was the victim of discrimination.
22. I shall accordingly focus in this judgment on the allegation that refusal of Madam Kong’s claim for CSSA benefit contravened her right as a Hong Kong resident to “social welfare in accordance with law”.
E.  The nature of the Article 36 right
23. As is true of many constitutional provisions, Article 36 is in very broad terms, conferring a constitutional right on Hong Kong residents “to social welfare in accordance with law”.  Apart from the CSSA scheme, which[17] forms the mainstay of social security in Hong Kong, the SWD provides a wide range of services.  They include family and children services; services for the elderly; rehabilitation and medical social services; services for offenders; services for community development; and services for young people.[18]  There is obviously room for argument as to whether all or only some part of those services come, as a matter of law, within the concept of “social welfare” for the purposes of founding a constitutional right under Article 36.  In my view, however, since the CSSA scheme aims to provide a welfare benefit addressing basic, “safety net” needs – a fundamental function of any social security system, such benefit is a clear case coming within the Article 36 concept of “social welfare”.  It was not suggested otherwise.  The question whether any other benefits and services provided by the SWD also fit within that concept must be left open.  Other facets of the system operated by the SWD might well give rise to different considerations and it should not be assumed that what is said in this judgment can necessarily be extrapolated for general application across the spectrum of services provided.
E.1  “In accordance with law”
24. Before examining the substantive content of the Article 36 right, one argument raised on Madam Kong’s behalf should be disposed of.  Professor Chan endeavoured to argue that restricting the pre-existing right to CSSA by imposing a seven-year residence requirement was constitutionally invalid because it had been effected administratively rather than by legislation. The argument was that the new policy was therefore not “in accordance with law”.
25. I am unable to accept that argument.  Article 145 recognizes and endorses the validity of “the previous social welfare system” which consisted of a non-statutory system of administrative rules and policies.  Accordingly, reading Article 36 together with Article 145, the intention of the Basic Law must be taken to be that such administrative system – consisting of rules that are accessible, systematically applied and subject to a process of administrative appeal – is to be treated as a system providing “social welfare in accordance with law” within the meaning of Article 36.
26. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the argument helps Madam Kong.  If, contrary to the view just expressed, it were correct to say that a purely administrative system does not provide “social welfare in accordance with law”, it would be difficult to see what rights are conferred by Article 36.
27. A system of social welfare catering for a wide range of clients in a wide range of different circumstances may well be better served by the operation of transparent and predictable administrative criteria rather than by having to have each benefit spelt out through a legislative process.
28. The evidence also shows that there was in fact very considerable interaction between members of the Administration on the one hand, and the Legislative Council; members of its Welfare Services Panel; and the Panel’s Subcommittee; on the other, in relation to the new residence requirement.  There was therefore in fact a substantial measure of public consultation and accountability.  The funding of the social welfare system as a whole is subject to approval by the Legislative Council’s Finance Committee.
E.2  The Court of Appeal’s approach to the Article 36 right
29. The Court of Appeal rejected Madam Kong’s argument as it was then put regarding the content of the Article 36 right, namely, that it “confers upon all Hong Kong residents a right to social welfare subject only to such restriction as is limited by law; which is to say, statute law or common law formulated with such precision as the occasion demands and which is accessible”.[19]
30. Stock VP saw as incurable defects in that argument, among other matters, its attempt to confer a right to all forms of social welfare regardless of eligibility criteria or level of benefit;[20] its tendency to ignore the sheer width and variety of social welfare benefits in Hong Kong while “cherry-picking” the one CSSA facet;[21] and its isolation of the Government’s social welfare obligations from its other cost-bearing social obligations and functions.[22] I would respectfully agree with Stock VP in rejecting the argument so put.
31. His Lordship went on to ask rhetorically: “What then of Article 36?”[23] His answer was that it was “... strictly speaking, not necessary for the purpose of the instant exercise to decide what article 36 does mean. It suffices, for the present purpose, to conclude, as I do, that it does not bear the meaning for which the applicant contends.”[24] His Lordship, however, added:
“...But one might nevertheless venture to suggest what article 36 read with article 145 envisage. With the previous social welfare system as a base, they envisage the continuous formulation and promulgation of policy in the realm of social welfare for the benefit of Hong Kong residents – as opposed to visitors – in the light of such economic conditions and social needs as prevail from time to time, with the objective of developing and improving the system, it being manifestly implicit that that objective can only be met if the system be nurtured and sustained for the meaningful benefit of future generations as well as the present. In order to meet these requirements and in any event inherent in any such system, the right to social welfare carries with it qualifying conditions. Hong Kong residents are to enjoy that right, so long as they meet the qualifying conditions, for the right itself includes the conditions. The conditions must be lawful, so that conditions that are discriminatory are not permissible.”[25]
32. With respect, I do not think that an adequate approach.  Its lays the emphasis entirely on Article 145 and deprives Article 36 of any meaningful effect.  It focuses on the Administration’s role in formulating social welfare policies, regarding it as free to define the eligibility and other conditions for any particular benefit, provided only that such conditions are not discriminatory.  But that allows the equality rights entirely to eclipse the welfare right.  The equality guarantees derive from Article 25 of the Basic Law and Article 22 of the Bill of Rights.  To say that the Administration cannot impose discriminatory eligibility conditions gives effect to those guarantees.  But it fails to attribute any meaning to the first sentence of Article 36 which states: “Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in accordance with law”.
E.3  The content of the Article 36 right
33. Those words unequivocally declare the Basic Law’s intention to create an independent head of constitutional protection in the context of social welfare rights.  True it is that Article 36 does not – and obviously cannot – descend into particulars as to specific welfare benefits or their eligibility and other conditions.  But that is because, like many other constitutional provisions, Article 36 is intended to operate as a framework provision.  Read together with Article 145, it provides the framework for identifying a constitutionally protected right to social welfare: Once it is clear that an administrative scheme such as the CSSA scheme has crystallized a set of accessible and predictable eligibility rules, those rules may properly be regarded as embodying a right existing “in accordance with law”, qualifying for Article 36 protection.
34. Article 145 supports this view.  It adopts the previous social welfare system as the basis for the Administration’s formulation of policies after 1 July 1997 to develop and improve that previous system in the light of economic conditions and social needs.  Article 145 therefore endorses the rules and policies established under the previous system and, as discussed above,[26] it implicitly regards them as rules established “in accordance with law” and thus capable of constituting particular rights protected by Article 36.
35. The relevant right given constitutional protection by Article 36 in the present case is the right defined by the eligibility rules for CSSA derived from the previous system of social welfare and in existence as at 1 July 1997.  Crucially, this means that Article 36 confers constitutional protection on the rules which laid down a one-year, and not a seven-year, residence requirement as a condition of eligibility for CSSA.
E.4  Modifying rights protected by Article 36
36. Social welfare rights which qualify as rights protected by Article 36 are subject to modification pursuant to policies generated by the Government in accordance with Article 145, as that Article plainly envisages.  The importance of a right being recognized as a social welfare right protected by Article 36 is that any restriction subsequently placed on that right is subject to constitutional review by the Courts on the basis of a proportionality analysis (as Lord Pannick QC, appearing for the Director[27] accepted).  The Government was therefore entitled to change its policy and to impose the seven-year requirement in place of the one-year requirement.  But it is also clear that such modification is subject to constitutional review.
37. I pause at this stage to dispose of an argument made on Madam Kong’s behalf which cannot be accepted.  It was submitted by Professor Chan that because Article 145 authorizes the Government to formulate policies “on the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and social needs”, it can only make changes which improve welfare benefits (in the sense of making them more generous) and cannot introduce a “retrogressive” change by imposing a much longer qualifying period of residence.  But Article 145 does not address, let alone freeze, the eligibility conditions or the level of any particular benefits.  What it does is to make it clear that the Government may formulate policies “on the development and improvement of [the previous] system”.  Lord Pannick rightly submitted that Article 145 does not preclude the elimination or reduction of particular welfare benefits if that proves necessary to develop, improve or maintain the sustainability of the welfare system as a whole.
E.5  Constitutional review where rights are protected by Article 36
38. As this Court has recognized, some rights are non-derogable and absolute, in which case, no infringement is permitted and no question of proportionality arises.[28]  But in other cases, it is well-established that the law may validly create restrictions on constitutionally protected rights provided that each such restriction can be justified on a proportionality analysis.
39. The starting-point is the identification of the constitutional right engaged[29] – Article 36 in the present case.  The next step is to identify the legal or administrative measure said to infringe or restrict that right – the imposition of the seven-year residence requirement in the present case (to which I shall return in greater detail).  The Court then asks whether that restriction pursues a legitimate societal aim and, having identified that aim, it asks whether the impugned restriction is rationally connected with the accomplishment of that end.  If such rational connection is established, the next question is whether the means employed are proportionate or whether, on the contrary, they make excessive inroads into the protected right.[30]
40. In some cases involving fundamental rights such as freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful assembly,[31] or rights bearing on criminal liability such as the presumption of innocence,[32] the Court has regarded the restriction as disproportionate unless it goes no further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question.  This is sometimes called the “minimal impairment” test.  Similarly, in discrimination cases, where the differentiating inroad is based on certain personal characteristics sometimes referred to as “inherently suspect grounds” such as race, colour, sex or sexual orientation, the Court will subject the impugned measure to “intense scrutiny”, requiring weighty evidence that it goes no further than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective in question.[33]
41. However, as the Chief Justice noted in Fok Chun Wah v Hospital Authority,[34] “... it would not usually be within the province of the courts to adjudicate on the merits or demerits of government socio-economic policies”.  Where the disputed measure involves implementation of the Government’s socio-economic policy choices regarding the allocation of limited public funds without impinging upon fundamental rights or involving possible discrimination on inherently suspect grounds, the Court has held that it has a duty to intervene only where the impugned measure is “manifestly without reasonable justification”.[35]  That is a test initially applied by the European Court of Human Rights while according a broad margin of appreciation to member States in setting and implementing their socio-economic policies.[36]  As the Chief Justice points out, the margin of appreciation principle has previously been adapted to apply in the context of our domestic law.[37]  It is appropriate similarly to apply the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test in our domestic context.
42. Professor Chan sought to argue that the challenged restriction in the present case should be regarded as a measure that contravenes fundamental rights or engages inherently suspect grounds of discrimination.  I do not agree.  The Article 36 right to social welfare is not a fundamental right but a right which intrinsically involves the Government setting rules determining eligibility and benefit levels.  It arises in an area where the Courts acknowledge a wide margin of discretion for the Government. As the Chief Justice pointed out in Fok Chun Wah,[38] the adoption of a residence requirement as a criterion of eligibility for social welfare benefits has often been upheld and is generally not regarded as engaging any of the inherently suspect grounds.
43. Accordingly, in my view, insofar as the disputed restriction in the present case is rationally connected to a legitimate societal aim espoused by the Government, the restriction will only be held to be disproportionate if it is manifestly without reasonable foundation.  I turn then to apply these principles to the facts of the present case.
F.  The right, the new restriction and the Director’s discretion
44. As we have seen, the right protected by Article 36 is the administratively defined right of Hong Kong residents who pass the means test and are not otherwise disqualified, to obtain CSSA payments after having resided here for one year.  That was the established position as at 1 July 1997 when Article 36 took effect.  There is no dispute that but for the seven-year residence requirement, Madam Kong would have qualified for CSSA after residing here for one year.  Her income has at all material times fallen below the level defined by the Director as necessary to meet basic needs.  The seven-year requirement therefore removed the safety net that would otherwise have been deployed in her case.
45. It is important to note the precise terms of the new restriction.  At a meeting of the Executive Council on 3 June 2003, the Council advised and the Chief Executive ordered that with effect from 1 January 2004:
“To be eligible for CSSA, a person must have been a Hong Kong resident for at least seven years ...[39]
Children aged below 18 are exempted from any prior residence requirement.
Current Hong Kong residents (i.e. those who have become Hong Kong residents before the seven-year residence rule comes into effect, viz. 1 January 2004 as proposed) [are also exempt[40]].
In exceptional circumstances, assistance may be granted at the discretion of the Director of Social Welfare (DSW) to a person who does not meet the residence requirement.”
46. The new residence requirement therefore does not apply to all new arrivals (the term used by the Director describe immigrants who have not yet resided here for seven years or more).  Children under 18 (who had previously been subject to the one-year residence requirement) and current Hong Kong residents[41] who pass the means test therefore qualify for CSSA payments.  So do other new arrivals for whom the requirement is waived as a matter of discretion.  The guidelines for the exercise of that discretion laid down by the Director are set out later in this judgment.[42]
G.  The Government’s purpose in adopting the seven-year rule
47. Turning to the next stage of the analysis, it is necessary to ask whether the seven-year restriction on the Article 36 right pursues a legitimate societal aim and, having identified that aim, to ask whether the restriction is rationally connected with the attainment of that end.
48. The restriction was recommended by the Task Force on Population Policy (“the Task Force”) chaired by the then Chief Secretary, Mr Donald Tsang, in its Report issued on 26 February 2003.[43]
49. It is worthwhile emphasising that a purpose relied on to justify a restriction on a constitutional right must be a legitimate societal aim.  In other words, it has to be an aim which furthers the legitimate interests of society.  The Government might simply state that it is cutting expenditure with the aim of “saving money”.  But saving money would not in itself be a legitimate aim.  The purpose and effect of the cut in expenditure would have to be taken into account.  If the cut in expenditure meant that the Government was abdicating an important responsibility which the government ought to discharge in the public interest, the saving of money by that means would not be a legitimate aim.  To take an extreme example, it would not be a legitimate aim to cut expenditure by say, halving the number of ambulances or fire engines, thereby endangering public safety.  In the present case, the Government is not saying that its aim is simply to save money.  It is saying that the restriction was introduced to save money because such savings are necessary to ensure the sustainability of the social security system.
50. Thus, explaining the new seven-year rule to the Legislative Council’s Panel on Welfare Services (“the Welfare Panel”) on 10 March 2004, the Director stated:
“The new residence requirement for social security benefits was recommended by the Task Force on Population Policy. Its aim was to provide a more rational basis for the allocation of public resources in the light of rising social expenditure and limited financial resources and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the provision of social security benefits to the community.”[44]
51. That is how the case has been argued.  Andrew Cheung J noted that the Director’s submission was:
“... that the legitimate aim of the seven-year residence requirement is to adopt a proper basis for the allocation of finite public resources in the light of rising social expenditure so as to ensure the long term sustainability of the provision of social security benefits to the society as recommended by the 2003 Taskforce on population.”[45]
52. It was an argument that the Court of Appeal accepted.  Stock VP stated:
“...ample justification has been provided for the contention that in order to sustain the viability of the social welfare system, the eligibility criteria required amendment. That was the result of anticipated problems posed by an ageing population, a low birth rate, by the fiscal deficit at the time of the decision, the continuing flow of OWP holders with a concomitant absence of control of immigration intake from that direction, decreasing emigration and the fact that the scheme was a non-contributory one.”[46]
53. In Mr Cheung’s Affirmation,[47] three related factors are said to contribute to the need for measures to safeguard the system’s sustainability: (i) the policy of accepting immigrants from the Mainland under the OWP scheme; (ii) Hong Kong’s ageing population; (iii) the rise in expenditure on CSSA.  The Government regards the seven-year restriction as a rational response to the sustainability problem so arising:
“Against the background of a serious fiscal deficit and the implication of demographic trends and characteristics identified in the [Task Force] Report, the Administration took the view that there was a strong case for applying a uniform 7-year residence requirement for providing heavily subsidized social services. In respect of CSSA, the Administration considered a 7-year residence requirement for new arrivals aged 18 or above to be a rational basis for allocation of social resources ...”[48]
54. Mr Cheung also puts forward certain other arguments championing the reasonableness of the rule, which I shall consider later.[49]  I wish first to focus on the question whether a rational connection exists between the avowed purpose of ensuring the financial sustainability of the social security system on the one hand and the seven-year residence requirement on the other.  I propose to examine each of the three factors said to underlie the sustainability problem and consider whether they provide or contribute to a rational justification for the seven-year restriction.
H.  The OWP scheme
H.1  The problem
55. The Task Force Report[50] explains the background and problem which had to be dealt with:
“Under Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law as interpreted by the NPCSC Interpretation dated 26 June 1999, Mainland children born to Hong Kong permanent residents have the right of abode in Hong Kong provided that at least one of their parents have obtained permanent resident status by birth or residence at the time of birth of the children. In anticipation of the implementation of the Basic Law, the daily OWP quota was increased from 105 to 150 in 1995 to facilitate the entry of these children. The remaining places are allocated to Mainland spouses and other OWP applicants with no right of abode who generally have to wait for a longer time before they can settle in Hong Kong. Currently, spouses in Guangdong have to wait for about seven to eight years.
The discrepancy in the times of arrival in Hong Kong between the CoE children[51] and their Mainland parents often gives rise to separated families. Concern has been expressed in the community about the various problems that are believed to have resulted from this situation, problems such as inadequate parental care, economic hardship if the Hong Kong parent has to give up a job to look after the children, adverse impact on family relationship, etc. As the number of new arrivals from the Mainland continues to grow, the problem of split-families also grows.  Many Legislative Council Members, academics and opinion leaders whom we approached have made the point strongly that the situation has to be properly addressed and that a proper balance has to be struck between orderly admission of new arrivals from the Mainland, both children and spouses, and upholding family unity.”
H.2  Family reunion as the main source of population growth
56. To address this problem, the Government, in cooperation with Mainland authorities, adopted the OWP scheme.  Mainland authorities issue OWPs in accordance with Mainland law, permitting the exit of Mainlanders to Hong Kong for settlement.  As the Task Force Report explains:
“The OWP Scheme is a scheme devised primarily to facilitate families with immediate members (spouses and children) residing in the Mainland to be reunited in Hong Kong. OWP holders can be broadly divided into two groups: children of Hong Kong permanent residents with Certificate of Entitlement (CoE); and spouses and other dependants. The CoE children are permanent residents and have right of abode in Hong Kong. Spouses and other dependants who enter Hong Kong on OWPs are non-permanent residents but may become permanent residents after having ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years.”[52]
57. The OWP scheme has become “the single most important immigration policy that shapes Hong Kong’s demographic growth and composition”, accounting for some 93% of population growth from 1997 to 2001.[53]  Applying the increased daily quota of 150,[54] about 55,000 Mainland immigrants are admitted each year.  The Task Force Report suggested that some 168,000 persons were in the queue waiting for a OWP.[55]  The Government has been content to maintain that rate of inflow.  In a press release issued upon publication of the Task Force Report on 26 March 2003, the then Chief Secretary stated:
“We respect the right of family reunion and the Right of Abode conferred by the Basic Law, and we have concluded that the present daily allocation of 60 within the 150 quota for children with right of abode in Hong Kong is appropriate. ... For the time being, the total daily quota of 150 will remain unchanged. The SAR Government will liaise closely with the Mainland authorities with regard to the numbers and the allocation among the categories. If there is evidence that the demand falls, we will discuss with the Mainland authorities to reduce the quota.”
58. Most new arrivals entering under the OWP scheme are children with the right of abode in Hong Kong and Mainland spouses coming to join spouses already resident here.[56] About half of the children tend to be under 18.  So in 1996, 48% were aged 19 or below;[57] and in 2002/03, 51.6% were 18 or below.[58]  The adult OWP holders are usually wives of Hong Kong residents.  Thus, in 2001, 65% of all OWP holders entering Hong Kong were females, mostly housewives.[59]
59. It is the Government’s policy to facilitate the integration of new arrivals in the community and the Task Force Report points out that:
“...there are few significant differences in university attendance between native-born children and the Mainlanders who came to Hong Kong before the age of nine. It is only among the ‘older’ Mainland children who arrived in Hong Kong after the age of nine that significant differences in university attendance exist. This suggests that the younger an OWP applicant is admitted, the easier it will be for him or her to adapt to Hong Kong’s education system.”[60]
60. The OWP scheme therefore favours younger children as immigrants and they are given the largest sub-quota (60) of the 150 daily quota.  They are likely to be qualified to settle in Hong Kong before their parent (usually the mother) on the Mainland (spouses separated for over 10 years being given a sub-quota of 30).  However, younger children obviously need parental care.  Since 2002, Mainland authorities have facilitated visits by spouses to their families in Hong Kong by allowing them to apply for two-way permits as and when they wish once they have applied for a OWP.[61]  This effectively allows family reunion to take place while the Mainland parent’s own OWP is pending.  The Task Force Report recommended that such spouses should be encouraged to take advantage of this to familiarise themselves with Hong Kong conditions and to help themselves decide whether to settle here.[62]
H.3  How the OWP scheme bears on the seven-year requirement
61. It is evident from the foregoing that no support for the CSSA seven-year requirement can rationally be derived from any aspect of the OWP scheme.  The humane and laudable purpose of that scheme is the promotion of family reunion, respecting the right of abode of children of Hong Kong permanent residents under the Basic Law.  It gives preference especially to younger children because they integrate more easily.  And realistically, to provide them with adult carers, their Mainland parents, usually their mothers, are encouraged to come to Hong Kong on two-way permits pending issue of the OWP applied for, eventually settling here as Hong Kong residents in their own right.
62. Where such a reunited family is poor, having means-tested income which does not cover the basic needs of its members, one would expect the social security scheme to operate in harmony with the OWP scheme and so make CSSA benefits available.  While it may be that the one-year residence requirement has to be accepted as the basic right to social welfare historically defined, it would be wholly irrational, when viewed from the perspective of the OWP scheme, to raise it to a seven-year requirement.  Although the Task Force Report contains considerable discussion of the OWP scheme, it provides no rational basis for adopting the seven-year rule.  On the contrary, its logic demands the disapplication of that rule in relation to OWP arrivals.
63. That logic has only partly been respected.  In line with encouraging younger immigrant children to come, new arrivals under 18 years of age have been exempted from the seven-year restriction, but – illogically – there is no such exemption for Mainland parents who come to take care of them.  It follows that unless the operative restriction is waived as a matter of discretion – a matter discussed further below[63] – such parents have to find some way to cope over a seven-year period even though a means test has shown that they are without sufficient income to meet their basic needs.
64. That counter-productive aspect of the seven-year requirement has not escaped members of the Welfare Panel.  At its meeting held on 10 March 2003, Ms Li Fung-ying is recorded as having stated that:
“... the seven-year residence requirement for the CSSA Scheme [was] a policy marred with contradiction, as its having the effect of deterring potential new arrivals to settle in Hong Kong was at variance with the policy of family reunion.”[64]
65. And after the seven-year requirement had been in place for some four years, the Sub-Committee appointed to review the arrangements for CSSA taking into consideration the views of the public, service users and non-governmental organisations providing welfare services, reported to the Welfare Panel[65] that deputations:
“...informed the Subcommittee that many new-arrival single mothers faced great financial hardship for being unable to meet the residence requirement. They were unable to find a suitable employment because of their low educational attainment and the need to take care of their young children. Given that these new arrivals were not eligible for CSSA, they had to rely on their child(ren)’s CSSA for a living.”
66. It is clear, to say the least, that the OWP scheme provides no support whatsoever for the Government’s alleged legitimate aim of ensuring the welfare system’s sustainability and no support for the existence of any rational connection between that aim and the impugned seven-year requirement.  The policies underlying the OWP scheme militate against that restriction.
I.    Hong Kong’s ageing population
67. The second factor said to underlie the Government’s avowed legitimate aim is the need to cater for an ageing population.  The Task Force identified the problem in the following terms:
“In 2001, Hong Kong’s total fertility rate reached an extremely low level of 927 children per 1,000 women, well below the replacement level of 2,100 children per 1,000 women. At the same time, life expectancy at birth is projected to reach 82 for men and 88 for women in 2031, one of the longest in the world.
Hong Kong’s population is aging. A quarter of its population is expected to be aged 65 or above by 2031. More significantly, the size of the workforce will shrink as the prime working age population declines.”[66]
68. In every society, the working age population economically supports children below, and the elderly above, working age.  The demographic pattern identified above undoubtedly presents a serious long-term problem since it projects a shrinking working age population having to support a growing number of long-lived elderly dependents.  The Task Force Report projects the following dependency ratios from 2002 to 2031:

Year

Child

Elderly

Overall

2002 

223

158

381

2006

203

162

365

2011

180

164

344

2016

178

198

376

2021

179      

245

424

2026

180

313

493

2031

182

380      

562
69. These figures indicate the projected numbers of children (those under 15) and the estimated numbers of elderly persons (those over 65) who will be dependent on every 1,000 persons between the ages of 15 and 65.  Thus, in 2002, for every 1,000 persons aged between 15 and 65, there were estimated to be 223 child dependents and 158 elderly dependents with a total overall dependency ratio of 381.  It was projected that over the years, the child dependency ratio would decline while the elderly dependency ratio would markedly increase from the year 2016 onwards.
70. This obviously has serious implications for the cost of caring for the elderly.  The Task Force puts this as follows:
“One serious economic problem caused by an accelerated increase in the number of elderly people in the population is social security payments. The Government is committed to providing financial assistance to elderly people in need. More than 600,000 persons aged 60 or above receive financial assistance through either the CSSA or the Old Age Allowance (OAA). ... Total Government expenditure in financial assistance for elders is estimated to be $11.8 billion in 2002-03, accounting for 5.4% of recurrent public expenditure and representing an increase of 50% when compared to the $7.8 billion paid out in 1997-98. The CSSA and OAA Schemes are funded entirely from General Revenue and are non-contributory. Should the rate of payment and eligibility for the OAA remain unchanged, it is estimated that by 2031, the total payment for OAA alone will rise to $10.4 billion. That for CSSA on elderly cases is estimated to leap-frog to $20.8 billion... Another serious economic problem caused by an aging population is steep increases in healthcare expenditure.”[67]
71. The Government is undoubtedly right to regard the problems of our ageing population as serious and right to lay down policies aimed at mitigating those problems with a view to ensuring the long-term sustainability of our social welfare system.  But what, if any, rational connection is there between such mitigation and the impugned policy of excluding new arrivals from receiving CSSA until they have resided here for seven years?  I do not think any such connection exists.
72. Given that one of the root causes of the ageing population problem is Hong Kong’s low fertility rate, and given that the OWP scheme has become “the single most important immigration policy that shapes Hong Kong’s demographic growth and composition”, with Mainland new arrivals accounting for 93% of our population growth between 1997 and 2001,[68] a rational response to the ageing problem ought to involve encouraging the entry of young immigrants to rejuvenate our population.  This was recognized by the Task Force which acknowledged that:
“...OWP holders, in particular young children, have contributed significantly towards mitigating the negative effects of low fertility and population aging by replenishing the dwindling number of our younger age cohorts.”[69]
73. As has already been pointed out, the Government has only partially acted on that logic, exempting those under 18 from the seven-year residence eligibility criterion for CSSA, but applying the restriction to parents who arrive to be reunited with and to care for such children.  To that extent, far from the seven-year requirement being a rational measure to mitigate the ageing population problem (and thereby contributing to the sustainability of our social security system), it is a counter-productive and irrational measure.
74. The evidence regarding social security payments to the elderly also belies any rational connection between the new restriction and the Government’s avowed aim of ensuring sustainability.  The seven-year restriction does not affect all elderly CSSA recipients, but only new arrivals who are elderly.  Such persons constitute only a small proportion of all new arrivals. The elderly are given a relatively low priority and thus are allotted a small sub-quota under the OWP scheme.  Thus, the Task Force Report[70] states that the 150 daily quota was allocated according to the following sub-quotas: 60 for children with Certificates of Entitlement; 30 for spouses separated for over 10 years; 60 for persons in all other categories, including spouses separated under 10 years; unsupported children coming to join relatives in Hong Kong; persons coming to Hong Kong to take care of their unsupported aged parents; unsupported elderly people coming to join relatives in Hong Kong and persons coming to Hong Kong to inherit legacies.
75. Of the relatively few elderly persons who do enter under the OWP scheme, only a small proportion[71] receive CSSA and Old Age Allowance.  And even before the seven-year requirement was introduced on 1 January 2004, there was already in place a stringent requirement in respect of Old Age Allowance: to be eligible, a person had to have resided in Hong Kong for not less than five years since attaining the age of 60.[72]  It follows that savings to CSSA expenditure that could be achieved by raising the requirement to seven years for new arrivals would be minimal and could hardly qualify as a response to the ageing population problem, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the welfare system.
J.  The rise in CSSA expenditure
76. There is no doubt that in the decade leading up to 1 January 2004, spending on CSSA had risen sharply and that it was the Government’s duty to consider policies aimed at ensuring its sustainability.
77. The first point to note, leaving aside for the moment the seven-year restriction, is that the Government did indeed confront the problem of steeply rising expenditure and did take action aimed at safeguarding its sustainability. The question which arises is whether, in the light of those measures, there is any rational basis for regarding the seven-year restriction on the Article 36 right as such a measure.
J.1  The December 1998 Report
78. The problem of sharply increasing expenditure was recognized and subjected to detailed consideration by an Inter-Departmental Steering Group chaired by the Director, which published a report dated December 1998.  The Report stated:
“The current review was prompted by growing public concern about the rapid growth in the CSSA caseload and its expenditure, the high levels of CSSA benefit for larger families as compared with market wages, and the sharp increases in the number of people of working age turning to CSSA. There is also an increasing perception that some people are abusing the system.”[73]
79. Key figures and concerns were given as follows:
“(a) The CSSA caseload rose by 146% from 88,600 in September 1993 to 218,400 in September 1998.
(b) The CSSA expenditure increased by nearly three times from $2.4 billion in 1993/94 to $9.4 billion in 1997/98.
(c) The average monthly CSSA payments for households of four or more persons are now considerably higher than low-end wages.
(d) The number of ‘unemployment’ CSSA cases increased over six times from 3,500 in September 1993 to 26,200 in September 1998, representing 12% of the total CSSA caseload. During the same period, the ‘single parent’ CSSA cases increased by 268% from 5,700 to 20,900, representing 10% of the total CSSA caseload.
(e)  There have been increasing calls for the Government to take more effective measures to prevent abuse of CSSA.  A special hot-line for reporting suspected CSSA fraud cases was set up by the Social Welfare Department (SWD) in August 1998. Up to the end of September 1998, it had received some 1,300 calls.”
The estimated CSSA expenditure for 1998/99 is expected to be above $13 billion. The Government will spend much more on CSSA in the years to come even if all the SG’s recommendations (see paragraph 8-29 below) are accepted and implemented.”[74]
80. The Steering Group was therefore examining increases in CSSA expenditure over the scheme as a whole, seeking to identify contributing factors and seeking ways to bring such expenditure under control.  There is no suggestion that CSSA claims by new arrivals merited any special attention or that they were a cause for concern.
81. The Steering Group made a series of policy recommendations, applicable across-the-board, mainly aimed at encouraging CSSA recipients to get jobs. To take one example, the Report noted that CSSA payments made to larger households resulted in per capita income that was larger than the per capita income of non-CSSA households in the lowest expenditure group,[75] with the likely result that able-bodied persons would opt to remain on welfare rather than getting a job.  In response, the Report recommended an across-the-board reduction in the standard rate of CSSA of 10% for households with three able-bodied adults and children; and of 20% for households with more than three such persons.[76]  It contained a calculation of the percentage savings to be achieved by such measures, ranging from a saving of 5% in single member households to 17% in households with five members.[77]  That recommendation was implemented in June 1999.[78]  Such a policy, creating disincentives against the development of a culture of dependence, may readily be seen as rationally aimed at ensuring sustainability.
J.2  Reduction in the standard rate
82. Another rational response to concerns about mounting expenditure and sustainability was the order of the Chief Executive in Council to reduce standard rates of CSSA across-the-board by 11.1% to take effect on various dates in 2003 and 2004.[79]
83. The Legislative Council Brief described the problem faced as involving unacceptable unabated growth in welfare expenditure.  It noted that upward adjustments had been made to standard rates by 6.5% in 1997-98 and 4.8% in 1998-99.[80] However, as at December 2002, the total CSSA caseload was 266,571, representing a year-on-year growth of 10.3%, with the “unemployed” CSSA caseload having increased by 40.3% over the same period.  This led to the projection that the approved provision of CSSA in 2002-03 of $16 billion (already up 11.1% on actual the expenditure of $14.4 billion in 2001-02) would be insufficient.  It was also estimated that the requirement for 2003-04 would be well in excess of $18 billion.[81]
84. This was seen as a threat to the system’s sustainability:
“Firstly, against the general economic situation and high unemployment, the number of families and individuals requiring support by Government is bound to increase. To sustain this safety net, we have to ensure our existing resources go further to meet the increasing demand. Secondly, prices for goods and services have come down considerably even as measured specifically by the SSAIP.[82] ... Thirdly, the HKSAR Government is facing some unprecedented budget deficits and of the Government is committed to restoring fiscal balance by 2006-07 as announced by the Financial Secretary...”[83]
85. The Government therefore decided to reduce the CSSA and SSA standard rates of payment:
“For fiscal reasons and to ensure that we could continue to meet increase in demand, it is therefore proposed that the CSSA and SSA rates should be adjusted downward; that the over-adjustments in standard rates for able-bodied recipients under the CSSA Scheme, and those of the non-means tested [Disability Allowance] under the SSA Scheme should be recouped in one go through an 11.1% reduction from June 2003 .... and for non-able-bodied CSSA recipients, namely the elderly, the disabled and those medically certified to be in ill health, the 11.1% reduction the standard rates will be effected in two phases, first by 6% from October 2003, followed by the second phase adjustment from October 2004.”[84]
86. Again, in my view, the rational connection between the sustainability objective and those across-the-board reductions of the standard rates is plain to see.
J.3  The seven-year residence requirement
87. The Government’s case in support of the seven-year requirement based on rising cost is unfocussed and sparse.  Mr Cheung points to rising public expenditure on social welfare generally (reaching $32.8 billion in 2006-07), with social security taking up the largest share (73%).[85] He indicates how overall spending on CSSA has increased over the past decade:
“In 1993-1994, expenditure for CSSA amounted to $2.4 billion. The upward trend in CSSA expenditure levelled off slightly between 1999 to 2001 at around $13.6 billion, and began to rise again in 2001-2002. In 2003-2004 Draft Estimates of Expenditure, the Administration was seeking a provision of $17 billion for CSSA to meet anticipated increase in demand. This is $780 million over the revised provision of $16.3 billion on 2002-2003.”[86]
88. He refers to new arrivals taking up CSSA benefits, stating:
“Between March 1999 and June 2002, it was estimated that new arrivals on CSSA benefits rose from 14.3% to 16.6% of all new arrivals.”
89. He then points out how expenditure on new arrivals has increased:
“The estimated CSSA expenditure on new arrivals increased from $1,467 million (or 10.8% of total CSSA expenditure) in 1999-2000 to $1,728 million (or 12% of total CSSA expenditure) in 2001-2002.”[87]
90. Those arguments are quite inadequate.  It is clear that spending on social welfare in general, and on CSSA in particular, has risen markedly over the past decade.   But that says nothing to justify the impugned restriction relating to new arrivals.  In March 2003, the Director reported that only 18% of new arrivals were on CSSA.[88]  And on the figures derived from the evidence,[89] new arrivals have generally made up 12% to 15% of the total number of CSSA recipients:

Year

Total of CSSA recipients

New arrival CSSA recipients

98/99

382,454

45,945 (12%)

Mar 2000

370,231

45,477 (12.3%)

Mar 2001

367,470

50,146 (13.6%)

Mar 2002

410,998

60,982 (14.8%)

Dec 2002

466,868

69,345 (14.9%)
91. As we have seen, the December 1998 Report of the Inter-Departmental Steering Group addressed the problem of rapidly increasing costs without anywhere suggesting that CSSA claims by new arrivals caused any particular problem or required any measures to be taken.  The overall increase in spending may obviously be due to a whole range of factors.  Thus, the 11.1% across-the-board reduction of standard rates implemented in 2003 and 2004 was a response to an unacceptable increase in expenditure attributable to upward adjustments subsequently thought to have been excessive.
92. Nor is it helpful for the Government simply to point to the increase in CSSA expenditure in relation to all new arrivals.  Without evidence as to the savings which the seven-year restriction has achieved by excluding the segment of new arrivals actually affected, it is very difficult to evaluate its rational connection (if any) with the avowed objective of ensuring sustainability of the social security system.
93. As emphasised above,[90] the precise terms of the seven-year residence requirement must be kept in mind.  By implementing the new rule, no savings are achieved in relation to new arrivals under 18 years of age; new arrivals already Hong Kong residents on 1 January 2004; and new arrivals who successfully obtained a waiver of the residence requirement.
94. The importance of those limits can be illustrated by considering the position in 2001-2002.  In that year, the cost of CSSA was $14.4 billion for all recipients.  The cost of CSSA paid to all new arrivals was 12% of the overall amount, namely, $1.7 billion.  If the seven-year requirement had then been in place, $964 million would have been paid in any event to those under the age of 18.
95. As to the remaining $764 million, those who were already Hong Kong residents in that year would also have received CSSA despite the new rule, and savings would have shrunk further when discretionary waivers were taken into consideration.  One would therefore have been left with savings in respect of new arrivals affected by the seven-year rule which represent a very small fraction indeed of the $14.4 billion overall expenditure on CSSA for that year.  It is true that in subsequent years, the number of recipients who have not resided here for seven years would progressively diminish.  It nevertheless remains the case that the actual savings would be proportionately reduced by payments made to residents in that class for each year over the entire seven-year period.
96. As pointed out above, the legitimate aim espoused is not merely saving whatever money might be saved, but preserving the system’s sustainability.  The relatively insignificant level of savings achievable by implementing the seven-year rule severely undermines the suggestion that the restriction was genuinely intended to be, or functioned as, a measure rationally designed to safeguard the sustainability of the social security system.
97. In fact, the Government has acknowledged the immateriality of the savings achievable by the seven-year requirement.  In its information paper dated 2 January 2004, the day after the new rule took effect, the Government informed the Welfare Panel’s Subcommittee that “Of the amount paid to the new arrivals in 2002-03, $963 million were made to those aged 18 or above and $1,068 [million] to those aged below 18.”  Revealingly, the Paper went on to state:
“The new residence requirements for CSSA are, however, not driven by the need to reduce CSSA expenditure on new arrivals, but by the need to adopt ‘the principle of seven-year residence requirement’ for providing social benefits heavily subsidized by public funds, as recommended by the Task Force on Population Policy, to ensure a rational basis on which our public resources are allocated. The Government remains committed to providing an effective and sustainable safety net for the financially vulnerable.” (Italics supplied)[91]
K.  Other justifications put forward by the Government
98. The reference to the so-called “principle of seven-year residence requirement for providing social benefits heavily subsidized by public” quoted above recalls a point made in the Task Force Report[92] as an additional reason for the seven-year restriction, as follows:
“Chapter III highlights the anomaly that exists in the eligibility criteria of various subsidized benefits in terms of length of residence in Hong Kong. Among the major benefits, a ‘seven-year’ residence rule is applied to public rental housing applicants (except children under the age of 18). In the case of CSSA, a ‘one-year’ residence rule is applied. No such rule is implemented for users of public health and hospital services; they are not even subject to means test.”
99. The Task Force Report went on to state:
“After careful consideration, the Task Force considers that there is a strong case for removing the anomaly that exists in the eligibility criteria for major subsidized benefits, and for applying a uniform seven-year residence rule for providing all heavily subsidized social services including CSSA and public healthcare benefits. Eligibility based on a seven-year residence requirement reflects the contribution a resident has made towards our economy over a sustained period of time in Hong Kong. A seven-year residence is also normally required for the grant of permanent resident status in Hong Kong, for which additional rights are prescribed in the laws of Hong Kong.”[93]
100. These suggestions[94] of course have nothing to do with promoting the financial sustainability of the social security system and do not provide any support for the seven-year residence requirement as rationally connected with the legitimate purpose proclaimed by the Government.
101. It is unclear whether the Director advances such grounds as separate purposes supplying independent legitimate aims capable of justifying the restriction of the Article 36 right.  If that is the intention, such grounds are, in my view, so lacking in coherence that they cannot properly serve as legitimate aims for the restriction.  Alternatively, if they do serve as such purposes, they are such insubstantial and socially insignificant aims that the restriction of the Article 36 right is a wholly disproportionate measure to achieve them, making it a measure that is manifestly without reasonable foundation.
K.1  Uniformity of qualifying periods
102. The first of the additional arguments mentioned above is the somewhat bizzare suggestion that there is some intrinsic value in having uniform qualifying periods for welfare benefits where such benefits are heavily subsidized by the state.  Symmetry for the sake of symmetry is hardly a legitimate aim.  Waiting times for public rental housing must obviously depend on the stock of public housing available and a shortage may lead to the setting of long qualifying periods.  Why should those qualifying periods be relevant to setting the eligibility period for CSSA payments intended to meet the immediate basic needs of indigent individuals and families?
103. It is also hard to understand why the absence of any residential requirement for access to public health and hospital services should be regarded as “an anomaly”.  It would indeed be a dysfunctional public health system if a person in need of urgent medical services were to be refused medical assistance on the ground that he or she has not met some residential qualification imposed simply to achieve “uniformity” with residential qualifications adopted for wholly different purposes.
104. It is also impossible to see how the seven-year qualifying period for permanent resident status laid down by Article 24(2) of the Basic Law is relevant.  That seven-year period is essentially a qualifying period for taking part in the government of the HKSAR.  One has to be a Hong Kong permanent resident to vote and stand for election;[95] to become Chief Executive;[96] to become a member of the Executive[97] or Legislative[98] Councils; and so forth.  It makes no sense to impose a like residence requirement for CSSA applicants simply to achieve a seven-year symmetry.
K.2  Contribution towards our economy
105. Another strand of these additional arguments involves the suggestion that:
“Eligibility based on a seven-year residence requirement reflects the contribution a resident has made towards our economy over a sustained period of time in Hong Kong.”[99]
106. This loses sight of the persons whose eligibility is in issue and the circumstances in which they find themselves. The evidence is that in 2002, in the 22-59 age group, 95% of new arrival CSSA recipients were women.[100] This pattern has continued so that new arrival recipients of CSSA are overwhelmingly likely to be women; and likely to be Mainland spouses reunited with their families in Hong Kong.  They are likely to be looking after children who have the right of abode, and are therefore likely to be unable, or to have very limited capacity, to take up outside employment.  In playing their role, they make a valuable contribution to our society, helping rejuvenate our ageing population, helping to integrate children with right of abode into our community and helping to avoid the socially disruptive consequences of split families.  They are persons who, on the Director’s own means test, are unable to meet their basic needs.  In such circumstances, it appears arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable to exclude them from CSSA benefits for seven years because of some notion that they should only receive such benefits in exchange for seven years’ worth of contribution to our economy.
107. But even where a Hong Kong resident, having arrived as holder of a OWP, is unable to work and is simply indigent, the idea of requiring him or her to contribute to our economy for seven years before being allowed to draw CSSA makes little sense.  The realistic view is that such person will need to draw upon, rather than make contributions to, our economic resources in the same way as an indigent permanent resident does.  It is illusory to think that adoption of a seven-year eligibility criterion is somehow going to turn such a person into a net contributor to the economy.
108. The idea of requiring seven years’ contribution to the economy as a condition of receiving CSSA is in truth a rejection of the principle, accepted in Hong Kong since 1970, that social welfare is the responsibility of the Government to be met by public funds.  Government officials in charge of social welfare have rightly rejected attempts to undermine that principle.
109. This is exemplified in two places in the December 1998 report of the Inter-Departmental Steering Group.  It will be recalled that the Steering Group recommended the reduction of the standard rate for larger households.[101] It had also been suggested that payment of standard rates to such households should be capped.  The Steering Group’s response was:
“We do not support this idea because by capping the benefits payable to larger households, the basic needs of some family members would not be provided for at all. This is against the objective of the CSSA Scheme.”[102]
110. They also referred to a suggestion that CSSA for able-bodied unemployed recipients should be cut off or reduced after a time limit of say, six months, so as to encourage them to find employment.  The Steering Group rejected that suggestion stating:
“...we do not propose to terminate or reduce assistance for able-bodied unemployed recipients after a time limit. A balance has to be struck between ensuring incentives to work and the guarantee of basic livelihood. If termination or reduction of benefits was to be introduced and was seen as leading to undue hardship, it would run the risk of undermining the fundamental function of our social security system.”[103]
111. Perhaps it is because the seven-year residence requirement originated, not in a specialist social welfare review, but as something of a side-wind deriving from a long-term population policy study, that there has not been proper recognition of the threat posed by the seven-year restriction to those fundamental social welfare values – values which have received constitutional acknowledgement in Article 36.
K.3  Fiscal deficit
112. Another point made by the Government on a number of occasions in seeking to justify the seven-year rule involves reference to the restriction being imposed a “against the background of a serious fiscal deficit”:
“Against the background of a serious fiscal deficit and the implication of demographic trends and characteristics identified in the [Task Force] Report, the Administration took the view that there was a strong case for applying a uniform 7-year residence requirement for providing heavily subsidized social services.”[104]
113. It is significant that the deficit is put no higher than a “background” feature.  It is also significant that when Stock VP referred to this, he spoke of “the fiscal deficit at the time of the decision”. Judicial notice may be taken of the following figures derived from the annual accounts published by the Government:[105]
Year
HK$ millions
Net Surplus /Deficit Operating revenue Operating expenses Expenditure on social security Exchange Fund surplus (deficit)
2002-2003 (43,384) 151,244 (210,727) (21,815) 31,488
2003-2004 10,979 (restated) 167,014 (212,188) (22,860) 65,738
2004-2005 19,434 192,369 (207,827) (23,247) 24,571
2005-2006 48,974 (restated) 231,156 (206,907) (23,444) 33,165
2006-2007 124,867 223,627 (208,318) (23,185) 65,887
2007-2008 179,343 265,269 (218,835) (24,130) 63,821
2008-2009 (133,103) 250,609 (251,775) (27,466) (146,429)
2009-2010 145,252 242,133 (251,376) (27,959) 116,309
2010-2011 96,724 274,637 (247,132) (25,928) 50,037
114. The figures show that there was indeed a net deficit in the year ended 31 March 2003.  However, the figures indicate that the seven-year rule was not introduced to cut spending so as to rein in that deficit.  They also show that such deficit was not a persistent feature of Government finances.  The figures suggest that the key determinants of whether there would be a net surplus or deficit were the level of operating revenue[106] and the results of investments made by the Exchange Fund.[107] Operating expenses[108] in general and spending on social security in particular were relatively stable and rose at a comparatively modest rate in the eight-year period after the deficit was incurred.  Healthy surpluses accrued in the five years following the deficit year as operating revenues increased and the Exchange Fund performed positively.  There then accrued a substantial deficit in 2008-2009, very largely due to poor Exchange Fund results, but that was reversed by a greater net surplus in the following year, followed by another hefty surplus in the subsequent year.  The fiscal deficit in 2002-03 is therefore indeed no more than a background feature in the discussion.  It makes no contribution to any justification of the seven-year rule.
L.  Prior warning, charities and the Director’s discretion
115. Finally, I should mention three arguments that the Director has advanced in aid of the submission that the seven-year residence requirement is a reasonable measure.  As I understand them, they are put forward at the proportionality stage of the argument.  In other words, the Director’s main proposition is that the seven-year requirement is justified as a rational measure aimed at ensuring the financial sustainability of Hong Kong’s social security system and that it is a reasonable policy because any hardship flowing from the restriction is catered for, or at least significantly mitigated, by the three matters to which I now turn.
L.1  Prior warning against coming to Hong Kong
116. First, the Director points out that the seven-year requirement has been widely publicised on the Mainland,[109] the intention being that:
“... a stricter residence requirement for CSSA would send a clear message to potential migrants that they should plan carefully and ensure that they have sufficient means to support themselves in Hong Kong.”[110]
117.       Making this point to the Welfare Panel, the Director stated:
“..., it is not unreasonable to expect the sponsoring persons in Hong Kong to support their sponsored new arrivals, or the new arrivals who are economically active to support themselves with their own means in Hong Kong. As the proposed measures are to take effect from a future date, potential new arrivals will have an opportunity to make an informed decision on whether they would move to Hong Kong for settlement taking account of all relevant considerations.”[111]
118. This is a highly unattractive approach.  It amounts to telling potential immigrants who have been granted OWPs: “If you are poor, stay home.  You will be ineligible for CSSA for seven years.  So don’t come to Hong Kong unless you can pay your own way or have someone who will support you.”  As was pointed out by a member of the Welfare Panel, it has “the effect of deterring potential new arrivals to settle in Hong Kong” and is “at variance with the policy of family reunion.” [112]  It runs counter to the avowed policies of respecting the rights of Mainland children with the right of abode; of promoting family unity; of promoting immigration of Mainland children to rejuvenate our ageing population when they are young and integrate more easily into our society.
119. I do not think this approach qualifies as a reasonable way to mitigate the hardship suffered by those caught by the seven-year residence requirement.
L.2  Reliance on charities
120. The Government also makes the argument that, if denied CSSA, new arrivals are able to seek help from charitable institutions. Mention is made of charitable trust funds which assist people in family crisis and temporary financial hardship, mainly in the form of one-off grants; charities which provide foodstuffs and hot meals; and charities which provide second-hand clothing, furniture and appliances, and so forth.[113]  It is self-evident that such charitable help can only be of a temporary or emergency nature.  It may supplement but cannot be a practical substitute for CSSA.
121. More importantly, the argument is in principle objectionable.  It really amounts to the Government abdicating its constitutional responsibility for social welfare to private charities and trying to make a virtue of the existence of such charities in the proportionality analysis.  The Hong Kong residents concerned find themselves destitute and eligible for short-term or emergency help from charities because they have been excluded from CSSA as a result of the Government’s adoption of the seven-year requirement.  It is exceedingly unattractive for the Government then to shrug its shoulders and say: “Well, you can always approach local charities as a supplicant for their goodwill”.
122. The primary responsibility of the Government for social security and the subsidiary role of voluntary agencies have been recognized since at least 1970 when, in a Memorandum for the Executive Council,[114] the Government stated:
“It is highly desirable, both at present and for future planning, that Government should be responsible for public assistance, and that there should be a clear distinction between the responsibilities of voluntary agencies in this and other social welfare fields.”
123. I am unable to regard possible reliance on charities as a reasonable proportionality argument to be weighed in support of the impugned restriction.
L.3  The Director’s discretion
124. Thirdly, the Director places heavy reliance on the existence of a discretion to waive the seven-year requirement as softening the impact of any hardship that may be caused by the restriction.  Thus, Mr Cheung states:
“... members of the [Welfare Panel] were informed that DSW would continue to exercise his discretion to waive the residence requirement in cases of genuine hardship, if necessary, thus making CSSA always available to the financially vulnerable in the absence of other options.”[115]
125. The evidence shows, however, that it is clearly not the case that CSSA is “always available to the financially vulnerable”.  It is important to note the qualifying words “in the absence of other options”.  In fact, the Government’s stance has been to treat the discretion as available only in exceptional cases.  It has been quick to deem an applicant to have “other options”.
126. The exceptional nature of the discretion was envisaged by the Task Force from the outset:
“For exceptional cases, the Director of Social Welfare, of course, will have discretionary power to grant CSSA on compassionate grounds waiving the residence rule.”[116]
127. And when, on 3 June 2003, the Chief Executive in Council made the Order that the seven-year requirement be implemented with effect from the following January, the fourth paragraph of the Order stated:
“In exceptional circumstances, assistance may be granted at the discretion of the Director of Social Welfare (DSW) to a person who does not meet the residence requirement.”
128. The Director has laid down guidelines[117] for the exercise of the discretion in the following terms:
(a) In general, financial hardship alone does not merit exceptional treatment, especially in the case of able-bodied adults.
(b) The [relevant officer] can exercise discretion to exempt a Hong Kong resident from the [seven-year] rule if the applicant can satisfy all [emphasis supplied] the following criteria:
(i)   having no or insufficient income to meet his/the family’s basic needs;
(ii)  having no relative or friend to turn to for assistance;
(iii)  no other forms of assistance being available to him/his family;
(iv)  having suffered a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances beyond his/her family’s control;[118]
(v)  having genuine difficulty in returning to his country of origin or the place where he came from;
(vi)  the total resources available to him/his family, including any savings and other assets held by him/his family and any CSSA payable to his family members, are not sufficient to meet his/his family’s recognised needs under the CSSA Scheme for two months.”
129. As paragraph (a) makes clear, the discretion is only intended to operate in exceptional cases and financial hardship alone generally does not qualify as “exceptional” even if the applicant is destitute. He or she must satisfy all six of the listed conditions.  Two of those conditions stand out.
130. First, as we have seen, the Director has made the argument in these proceedings that, if denied CSSA, new arrivals are able to seek help from charitable institutions.  If that is the view generally taken by social welfare officers, applicants for a waiver are likely to find condition (iii) – the possible availability of other forms of assistance – an important obstacle in many cases.
131. Secondly, condition (v) – refusal of a waiver if the applicant is able to return to where he or she came from – is important.  Although the discretion is held out as a measure mitigating hardship caused by the seven-year residence requirement and relied on as demonstrating the proportionality of that restriction, paragraph (v) places severe limits on the discretion.  It instructs social welfare officers to tell the applicant: “Go back to where you came from,” unless the applicant faces “genuine difficulty” going back.
132. I have described[119] as highly unattractive the Director’s practice of warning potential immigrants who hold OWPs (other than exempted new arrivals) to stay home and not to come to Hong Kong unless they are able to support themselves, since it contradicts avowed policies of promoting family unity for Mainland children with the right of abode; of rejuvenating our ageing population, and so forth.  Condition (v) operates in the same vein.  It involves abdicating responsibility for providing social welfare assistance to indigent new arrivals who have become Hong Kong residents and who are present in Hong Kong, unable to meet their basic needs, telling them that they should leave Hong Kong and go back to where they came from.  A discretion that is subject to such a condition does little to establish the proportionality of the seven-year restriction of the Article 36 right.
133. The available statistics tend to confirm that the discretion plays only a small part in dealing with new arrivals who apply for CSSA but have not met the residence requirement.  Only a small proportion (ranging from 2.4% to 9%) of such applicants go on to apply for a discretionary waiver. A very high proportion of those applicants (from 62% to 78%) then withdraw their applications (one assumes on being told that they do not meet the criteria), leaving a small number of live applications, most of which are then approved.  The figures are as follows:

2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
CSSA applications received not meeting residence requirement 68,601 62,097 54,746 46,807
Applications for waiver 1,665 (2.4%) 3,856 (6.2%) 4,925 (9%) 3,553 (8.5%)
Applications for waiver withdrawn 1,299 (78%) 2,892 (75%) 3,480 (70%) 2,221 (62%)
Applications approved 230 843 1,383 1,307
Applications rejected 18 26 33 39
134. After the death of her husband (who left her only $982.37) and having been made homeless, Madam Kong survived by living in a shelter for street sleepers and receiving some financial help in the form of one-off payments from certain charities.[120]  She was willing to work and had attended government training courses with a view to finding employment. She had found sporadic casual jobs as a cleaner (at $175 per day) and as a substitute security guard (at $200 per 12 hour shift).  When she applied for a waiver, she explained that her staying at the shelter was unsatisfactory because it did not open until 5.30 pm, so that she had to sleep in a park if she had been on night shift as a security guard.  She submitted that she needed CSSA to meet her housing needs “in order to have better rest before she could find stable gainful employment”.  She admitted owning a property on the Mainland but explained that it was an illegal structure which was occupied by her two sons who were themselves without means, and was not a property that she could sell.
135. The Board applied the guidelines in rejecting her application.  It noted that financial hardship alone does not merit exceptional treatment and found that the death of her husband did not count as a “substantial and unexpected change in circumstances beyond her control”, as she should have realised that she could not depend financially on her late husband who was an aged CSSA recipient suffering from chronic disease.  It noted that she had expressed confidence in being able to find a job but concluded that after her husband’s death, as she had no relatives or friends in Hong Kong, “it would be a better alternative for Madam Kong to return to her native place”. 
136. If the disposal of Madam Kong’s application is anything to go by, the guidelines result in applicants for a waiver facing a very high threshold indeed.
M.  Summary and conclusions
137. I have reached the conclusion that the seven-year residence requirement is an unjustifiable contravention of the right to social welfare in accordance with law, conferred by Article 36.
138. In seeking to address basic, “safety net” needs pursuant to an accessible and predictable set of administrative rules, the CSSA scheme clearly comes within the Article 36 concept of a “social welfare” scheme established “in accordance with law”.  It receives Article 36 protection, and while the Government has a wide margin of discretion, both in defining the conditions and level of the benefit in the first place, and in making any changes pursuant to policies developed in accordance with Article 145, such changes are subject to constitutional review.
139. Restrictions on rights protected by Article 36 must pursue a legitimate societal aim and must be rationally connected with the achievement of that end, employing measures that do not make excessive inroads into the protected right.  If the restriction is not rationally connected to the avowed legitimate purpose or if the inroads it makes into the protected right are manifestly without reasonable foundation, the Court may declare the measure unconstitutional.
140. In the present case, the Government has claimed that the seven-year residence requirement pursues the legitimate purpose of curbing expenditure so as to ensure the sustainability of the social security system. In my view that claim is not made out.  The seven-year restriction conflicts with two important social policies which are simultaneously embraced by the Government, namely the OWP family reunion policy and the population policy aimed at rejuvenating our ageing population.  There is no evidence as to the level of savings actually achieved and achievable as a result of adopting the seven-year rule.  On the contrary, everything points to the actual savings being modest and of an order that cannot sensibly be described as designed to safeguard the system’s sustainability.  The Government has indeed admitted that the new residence requirement is not driven by the need to reduce CSSA expenditure on new arrivals.
141. Other matters identified as objectives promoted by the seven-year rule include a search for uniformity in qualifying periods for heavily subsidized benefits and a policy of withholding benefits until the applicant has contributed to our economy for seven years.  These are purposes that either lack legitimacy as societal aims or are wholly insubstantial in terms of societal interests.  If the restriction has to rest on such purposes, it must be viewed as a restriction that is manifestly without reasonable foundation.
142. Many of the Government’s arguments seek to sidestep the issue and fail to confront the constitutional issue altogether. They abdicate responsibility for addressing the right conferred by Article 36 on Hong Kong residents to social welfare in accordance with law.  They suggest that indigent newly arrived residents should look to charities rather than the social welfare system; that they should not have come here in the first place without ensuring that they could support themselves; or, if already here, that they should not receive any discretionary assistance to meet their basic needs but should go home instead.  These arguments do not provide any justification for the restriction.
143. I do not doubt that the Government adopted policies genuinely with the legitimate aim of curbing expenditure on CSSA with a view to ensuring the financial sustainability of the social security system. I readily accept that it did take rational measures towards that end by reducing standard payments in 1999 in relation to larger households and reducing standard payments across-the-board in 2003 and 2004.  But in my view, the Director has not made good the proposition that the seven-year residence requirement was rationally connected to the aforesaid legitimate aim.  If there was any rational connection, the restriction was wholly disproportionate and manifestly without reasonable foundation, given its contradictory policy consequences and socially insubstantial benefits.
144. I accordingly conclude that the appeal must be allowed and that the seven-year residence requirement must be declared unconstitutional, restoring the pre-existing residence requirement of one year.  There can, however, be no constitutional objection to the Government’s exempting new arrivals under the age of 18 from any residence requirement and the Order which I would make does not seek to re-impose a one-year residence requirement on new arrivals in that age group.  It merely declares unconstitutional the policy expressed in the words “To be eligible for CSSA, a person must have been a Hong Kong resident for at least seven years” contained in the first sentence of the Order made by the Chief Executive in Council on 3 June 2003 to take effect on 1 January 2004.[121]
145. I would also make an order nisi that the Director pay Madam Kong’s costs here and below and direct that any submissions as to costs be made in writing and lodged with the Registrar within 21 days from the date of this judgment and that any submissions in reply be lodged within 21 days thereafter, in default of such submissions, the order nisi to stand as an order absolute without further order.  I would order the appellant’s costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.
Mr Justice Tang PJ :
146. I agree with the judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ.
Mr Justice Bokhary NPJ :
Judicial role in regard to socio-economic rights
147. This case is about social welfare.  Policy matters thereon are for the political branches of government.  But there is in Hong Kong a constitutional right to social welfare.  And the responsibility for enforcing constitutional rights, socio-economic ones no less than other ones, rests with the courts.  In discharging this responsibility, it has to be recognized that courts are not ideally equipped to undertake resource allocation.  At the same time, the courts cannot decline to intervene if the legislative (or administrative) scheme in question fails to accord people the basic necessities to which they are constitutionally entitled.  The approach formed by those two propositions is one at which I arrive on principle.  It is, however, worth noting that it happens to be the approach adopted by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland in V v. Einwohrnergemeine X und Regierunsgrat des Kantons Bern BGE/ATF 1211  1367, 27 October 1995.
CSSA and the residence requirement
148. The form of social welfare concerned in the present case is Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (commonly known as “CSSA”). It is non-contributory and means-tested.  Payments thereunder are made in cash.  Its purpose is that of enabling recipients to meet basic needs.  The scheme under which it is operated (which it is convenient to call “the CSSA scheme”) is an administrative scheme, not a statutory scheme.
149. There is a residence requirement for the receipt of assistance under the CSSA scheme.  This requirement applies to adults.  It is that they must have been a resident of Hong Kong for at least 7 years by the time of their application for CSSA.
Question
150. Is that requirement constitutional or unconstitutional?  That is the question now before this Court.  The learned judges in the courts below (being Andrew Cheung J in the High Court and Stock VP and Lam and Barma JJ in the Court of Appeal) have concluded that the requirement is constitutional.  Their conclusion is disputed by the appellant Madam Kong Yunming for whom Professor Johannes Chan SC and Mr Hectar Pun appear.  It is supported by the respondent the Director of Social Welfare for whom Lord Pannick QC and Mr Abraham Chan appear.  Such being the legal representation, the rival submissions prepared and presented have of course been of the highest quality.
Facts
151. Shortly stated, the facts are these.  Madam Kong was born in the Mainland in 1949.  In 2003 she married a Hong Kong permanent resident.  He had been a CSSA recipient since 1985.  In November 2005 she was granted a one-way permit to come to Hong Kong in order to settle here.  On 21 December 2005 she arrived in Hong Kong for that purpose.  Tragically, her husband, who had been in ill-health, died on the following day.  She tried to have herself registered as the new tenant of the public housing unit which had been allocated to him.  But that was turned down.  The Housing Authority repossessed the unit.  She became homeless, and was admitted to a street sleeper shelter.  All that she received from her late husband’s estate was a sum of $982.37.  She lived on charity.
152. On 20 March 2006 she applied for CSSA.  Her application was turned down on the sole ground that she did not meet the residence requirement, the Director of Social Welfare refusing to exercise his discretion to waive that requirement in her case.  Her appeal to the Social Security Appeal Board against this refusal was launched in June 2006, heard in October that year and dismissed in the following month.
153. In 2008 she commenced the judicial review proceedings by which she challenged the constitutionality of the 7-year residence requirement.  That is the challenge which, having failed in the courts below, has now reached this Court.  The question of law on which the Appeal Committee granted Madam Kong leave to appeal to this Court is framed by reference to equality as well as the right to social welfare.
154. Cases like this one seem to be seen by some people as contests between long-term locals and Mainland arrivals.  But they are not.  Nor are they to be seen as contests between the “haves” and the “have-nots” in our society.  Cases like this one are about – and only about – what an independent and impartial judiciary will, after receiving and weighing full and rational argument on both sides of the question, adjudge to be the true constitutional position.  That, no more and no less, is what cases like this one are about.
Guarantees of equality
155. Under our constitutional arrangements, equality is guaranteed by art. 25 of our constitution the Basic Law.  This article provides that “[a]ll Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law”.  (As art. 24 of the Basic Law provides, Hong Kong residents consist of permanent residents and non-permanent residents: permanent residents having the right of abode and being qualified to obtain permanent identity cards which state their right of abode; and non-permanent residents being qualified to obtain identity cards but having no right of abode).
156. A constitutional guarantee of equality is also to be found in the Bill of Rights.  Taken word-for-word from art. 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“the ICCPR”) and entrenched by art. 39 of the Basic Law, art. 22 of the Bill of Rights provides as follows:
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
157. It will be noticed at once that those guarantees of equality are not confined to permanent residents.  Article 25 of the Basic Law speaks of all residents, and art. 22 of the Bill of Rights speaks of all persons.
Right to social welfare
158. Turning to the right to social welfare, it, too, is not confined to permanent residents.  Article 36 of the Basic Law confers this right on Hong Kong residents, not just Hong Kong permanent residents, saying this:
“Hong Kong residents shall have the right to social welfare in accordance with law. The welfare benefits and retirement security of the labour force shall be protected by law.”
Development and improvement
159. The development and improvement of social welfare is an obligation placed on the Government by art.145 of the Basic Law which reads:
“On the basis of the previous social welfare system, the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, on its own, formulate policies on the development and improvement of this system in the light of the economic conditions and social needs.”
Economic conditions and social needs
160. As can be seen, the expression “in the light of economic conditions and social needs” comes immediately after the reference to the development and improvement of the previous welfare system.  I readily accept that economic and social conditions can justify slowing down or temporarily halting such development and improvement.  What about new restrictions on the availability of social welfare?  If the new restrictions go to undoing development and improvement introduced after the coming into effect of the Basic Law, then I think that a really serious economic downturn might justify such restrictions.  Can an economic downturn justify moving the welfare systems backwards from where it had stood when the Basic Law came into effect?  I would not rule that out but find it difficult to see how any economic downturn can justify such a course unless it is so dire as to bring about a situation not contemplated by the constitution.  If art. 145 of the Basic Law is less protective than that, it would of little practical use.
Residence requirement made seven times more restrictive
161. The CSSA scheme was introduced in 1973.  From that time until 1 January 2004, the residence requirement for the receipt of CSSA was one year.  The CSSA scheme with a one-year residence requirement is part of the “previous welfare system” to which art. 145 refers.  That is easy to see.  The Basic Law was promulgated and adopted on 4 April 1990 and came into effect upon the handover on 1 July 1997.  So the CSSA system with a one-year residence requirement was in place when the Basic Law was promulgated and adopted and when it came into effect.  The one-year residence requirement stood until it was turned into a seven times more restrictive requirement of 7 years’ residence with effect from 1 January 2004.  That was done by an order made by the then Chief Executive in Council on 3 June 2003 following a recommendation put forward by the Task Force on Population Policy in its report of 26 February 2003.
Residents and non-residents
162. Neither art. 36 nor art. 145 of the Basic law, each of which deals with the position of Hong Kong residents, was engaged in the case of Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409.  That case was about the exclusion of non-resident women from receipt of subsidized obstetric services at public hospitals in Hong Kong and about increases in the charges payable by them for obstetric services at such hospitals.  As can be seen from para. 90 of the judgment in that case, what was upheld was the drawing of a line between residents and non-residents.  There was no question of treating non-permanent residents as outside the protection of art. 36 or 145 of the Basic Law.
163. A word should be said about art. 41 of the Basic Law, which reads:
“Persons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region other than Hong Kong residents shall, in assistance with law, enjoy the rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents prescribed in this Chapter”.
That was not treated by the Court in Fok Chun Wa’s case to mean that every right and freedom prescribed in Chapter III of the Basic Law was enjoyed by non-residents.  Article 41 of the Basic Law calls for purposeful construction in the context of the Basic Law as a whole. Upon such a construction, it will be seen at once that some Chapter III fundamentals, for example freedom from torture, must by their very nature and in conformity with international human rights norms, extend to all persons present in Hong Kong.  But that is not so in regard to the right to social welfare.
Unwarranted retrogression
164. Even without reference to the right to equality before the law, the requirement of 7 years’ residence for receipt of CSSA is unconstitutional.  If necessary, I would be prepared so to hold on the following basis. The introduction of a 7-year requirement to replace the one-year requirement moved the previous social welfare system backwards. It therefore runs counter to art.145 of the Basic Law which, as far as that system is concerned, contemplates progression and leaves no room for retrogression except in a situation so dire as to lie beyond the contemplation of the constitution.  And no such situation has arisen.  So the increase from one year’s residence to 7 years’ residence amounts to unwarranted retrogression and is therefore unconstitutional.
165. But I am content to hold that increase unconstitutional on another basis, being the one to which I now turn.
Unjustified distinction
166. We are in this case concerned with equality in regard to a socio-economic right.  In Social Rights Jurisprudence:  Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (ed.  Malcom Langford) (2008) (Cambridge University Press) at the page immediately preceding the table of contents, what Justice Albie Sachs of the South African Constitutional Court said about socio-economic rights when speaking at the Southern  Methodist University School of Law in 1999 is quoted.  He said:
“There is growing acceptance all over the world that certain core fundamental values of a universal character should penetrate and suffuse all governmental activity, including the furnishing of the basic conditions for a dignified life for all.
I believe that 21st-century jurisprudence will focus increasingly on socio-economic rights.”
I respectfully share that perception and that belief.
167. Professor Chan was in the company of Hong Kong’s leading constitutional lawyer, Professor Yash Ghai, when they said two decades ago (in The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: a Comparative Approach (eds Johannes Chan and Yash Ghai) (1993) (Butterworths Asia) at p.5) that “(i)n countries with an established tradition of constitutionalism, the rule of law is acceptable because economic and social rights are woven into the fabric of public law.”  And their writings are in the company of, for example, Robert Alexander: The Voice of the People (1997) (Weidenfeld & Nicolson) where it is said at p.196 that “human rights…prevent the weakest going to the wall” and John P Humphrey: Human Rights and the United Nations (1984) (Transnational Publishers) where it is said at p.2 that “[h]uman rights without social and economic rights have little meaning for most people”.
168. Socio-economic rights are not alien to common law systems.  Common lawyers may be generally more familiar with civil and political rights than with rights of a socio-economic nature.  But as Professor Geraldine Van Bueren QC demonstrates in “Socio-Economic Rights and a Bill of Rights – An Overlooked British Tradition” [2013] Public Law 821, socio-economic rights, too, have historical origins that can be traced back to medieval times in the land where the common law came to life.
169. In recommending a requirement of 7 years’ residence, the Task Force on Population Policy said in para. 5.56 of its report of 26 February 2003 that:
“Eligibility based on a seven-year residence requirement reflects the contribution a resident has made towards our economy over a sustained period of time in Hong Kong. A seven-year residence is also normally required for the grant of permanent resident status in Hong Kong, for which additional rights are prescribed in the laws of Hong Kong”.
That is followed by a footnote which says that those additional rights include “the right to vote and to stand for election under Article 26 of the Basic Law and to become the principal officials of the HKSAR in accordance with Article 61”.
Departures from equality have to be justified
170. Departures from equality have to be justified. The departure from equality brought about by the requirement of 7 years’ residence cannot be justified.  Its effect – and its declared objective, too, it might be added – is essentially to draw a distinction between permanent residents and non-permanent residents in regard to the right to social welfare.  This distinction is drawn in the face of a constitutional guarantee which extends to all residents without distinction.  Even treating art. 145 of the Basic Law as far less protective of disadvantaged people than I consider it to be, by no standard of review, test or approach that preserves rather than undermines constitutional guarantees can such a distinction be justified.
Basic Needs
171. Nothing more has to be said, but more could be said.  We are, after all, concerned with basic needs.  On what basis do I say that the present case concerns basic needs?  I am prepared to say so on the basis that a right to social welfare, if it is to have any meaningful content, must encompass basic needs at the very least.  But it is not necessary to proceed on that basis if one prefers not do so, for the Government accepts that CSSA is there to enable persons to meet their basic needs.  The requirement of 7 years’ residence would leave needy members of one category of residents dependent on exercises of discretion or charity in order to meet basic needs. Whatever else the Government may be saying about Hong Kong’s resources, I do not understand the Government to be going to the extreme of saying that those resources are in a state that compels the imposition of a residence requirement of 7 years even though that has the effect of excluding non-permanent residents from the right to social welfare conferred by the constitution on all residents, permanent and non-permanent alike.
172. As to the Task Force on Population Policy’s reference to the right to become a principal official, that right depends also, as one can see from art. 61 of the Basic Law, on being a Chinese citizen with no right of abode in any foreign country.  No one has suggested that it would be constitutional to make that status a condition of receipt of social welfare in Hong Kong.
ICESCR
173. Even though I am of the view that Madam Kong should succeed without having to rely on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“the ICESCR”), I propose to deal with this covenant, we having received full argument on it.
174. In 2003, which is the year before the residence requirement for the receipt of CSSA was raised from one year to 7 years, the Hong Kong Government submitted a report to the United Nations’ Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (“the CESCR”) in which this was said:
“It is true that there is no single law – corresponding to the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance in relation to the ICCPR that incorporates the ICESCR into Hong Kong’s domestic legal order. However, ICESCR provisions are incorporated into our domestic law through several Articles of the Basic Law (for example Articles 27, 36, 37 137, 144 and 149), and through provisions in over 50 Ordinances. Those laws were listed in Annex 3 to the initial report, and are updated at Annex 2A of the present report. We consider that specific measures of this kind more effectively protect Covenant rights than would the mere re-iteration in domestic law of the Covenant provisions themselves.”
The Hong Kong Government said in Annex 2A of that report that art. 39 of the Basic Law is the constitutional guarantee for art. 2 of the ICESCR and that arts 36 and 145 of the Basic Law are the constitutional guarantees for art. 9 of the ICESCR.
175. Article 39 of the Basic Law reads:
“The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
    The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law.  Such restrictions shall not contravene the provisions for the preceding paragraph of this Article.”
It will be observed that this article, too, speaks of residents and not only of permanent residents.
176. Turning to the two articles of the ICESCR which the Hong Kong Government told the CESCR are constitutionally guaranteed in Hong Kong, art. 2 reads:
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”
And art. 9 reads:
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”
What the CESCR said
177. Now let us look at what the CESCR said about CSSA in general and the 7-year residence requirement in particular.  That was said on 13 May 2005 in the CESCR’s concluding observations on economic, social and cultural rights in the People’s Republic of China (including Hong Kong and Macao) for which the reference is UN Doc E/C. 12/1/Add.107, §84.  And this is what was said:
“The Committee is seriously concerned that under the existing social security system, and in particular under the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA), the levels of benefit are not sufficient to guarantee a decent standard of living and the many low-income persons, in particular older persons, are not covered by the scheme. The Committee is further concerned that new migrants are unable to apply for CSSA due to the seven-year residence requirement.”
178. Coming from no less a source than the CESCR, none of that is anything that an international financial centre (as Hong Kong is recognized in art. 109 of the Basic Law to be) can feel comfortable to read about itself.  However that may be, the sufficiency or otherwise of benefit levels is not before the Court in this appeal.  But what the CESCR says about the 7-year residence requirement’s adverse effect on new migrants is directly relevant in the present appeal, because it highlights the fact that the requirement excludes for a long time a large class which the relevant constitutional guarantees do not exclude at all.
Retrogressive in regard to basic needs and deliberately so
179. Such exclusion is retrogressive.  What makes it all the more serious is that it is retrogressive in regard to basic needs and deliberately so.  In this connection, it is to be remembered that the CESCR had, on 14 December 1990, said this in its General Comment No.3, the reference for which is UN Doc E/1991/23, §9:
“The principal obligation of result reflected in article 2 (1) is to take steps “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized” in the Covenant. The term “progressive realization” is often used to describe the intent of this phrase. The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time. In this sense the obligation differs significantly from that contained in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which embodies an immediate obligation to respect and ensure all of the relevant rights. Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.”
180. Much the same point is made in, for example, Sandra Liebenberg, “Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights” (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review 5 and Aoife Nolan, Bruce Proter and Malcolm Langford, “The Justifiability of Social and Economic Rights: an Updated Appraisal” CHRGJ Working Paper No. 15, 2007.  In the “Right to Welfare” chapter of Law of the Hong Kong Constitution (eds Johannes Chan and C L Lim) (2011) (Sweet & Maxwell) – a book cited by Lord Pannick in the course of argument (although not on this point) – Professor Karen Kong put it like this (at p.798, para 25.040):
“As suggested by Sandra Leibenberg in relation to South African court’s adjudication of social rights, ‘claims involving a deprivation of basic needs should attract a high level of judicial scrutiny’. Aoife Nolan et al. also commented, ‘[i]n general, Government will be held to a stricter test in relation to available resources when existing programs are cut than they might be with regard to a simple failure to take positive steps to create programs or enhance them.’ The stricter test will include imposing a heavier burden on the Government to justify potentially retrogressive measures, and the need to show that alternative measures had been carefully considered.”
Discretion
181. In seeking to justify the raising of the residence requirement from one year to 7 years, the Government places some reliance on the Director of Social Welfare’s discretion to waive the residence requirement.  A discretion to waive is also a discretion not to waive.  It is not suggested that the discretion would invariably, or even generally, be exercised in favour of any person who, absent a waiver, would be driven to seeking charity in order to meet her or his basic needs.
182. There is in any event, an inherent and fundamental weakness in the Government’s “discretion” argument.  As Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said in Scott v. Scott [1913] AC 417 at p 477, to remit the maintenance of a constitutional right to the region of discretion is to shift the foundations “from the rock to the sand”.
Other benefits
183. Then the Government places some reliance such other welfare benefits as a needy person who is excluded from the CSSA scheme for want of 7 years’ residence, and who fails to obtain a discretionary waiver, might be able to obtain.  But since CSSA is designed to meet basic needs, what can such other benefits really do, even if obtained, in the absence of CSSA?
Charity
184. And then the Government places some reliance on such charity as such a person may be able to obtain.  As to that sort of argument, there is the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in the case of Khosa v. Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 505.  At para. 80 Mokgoro J spoke of the likely impact on a group of persons excluded from the constitutional right to social security.  He said that such exclusion “is likely to have a severe impact on the dignity of the persons concerned, who, unable to sustain themselves, have to turn to others to enable them to meet the necessities of life and are thus cast in the role of supplicants”.  That reflects the classic view.  In the concluding section of the chapter on “Rights, Freedoms and Social Policies” of his book Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order, 2nd ed (1997) (Hong Kong University Press), Professor Yash Ghai quotes (at p.454) Alexis de Tocqueville’s statement that:
“There is nothing which, generally speaking, elevates and sustains the human spirit more than the idea of rights. There is something great and virile in the idea of rights which removes from any request its suppliant character, and places the one who claims it on the same level as the one who grants it.”
Not proportionate
185. A decrease in expenditure on the CSSA scheme is a lawful objective.  But just because it is legitimate to do something, it does not mean that whatever is done will be legitimate.  The raising of the residence requirement from one-year to 7 years, putting the burden of that increase on immigrants so as in effect to exclude non-permanent residents from the right to social welfare conferred by the constitution on all residents without distinction has not been shown to be a proportionate means by which to obtain that objective.
Conclusion
186. The one-year residence requirement was part of the previous system on the basis of which art. 145 of the Basic Law required the Government to formulate its policies for the development and improvement of social welfare in the light of economic conditions and social needs.  We have not been asked to hold that the residence requirement of one year had also been unconstitutional, and I see no reason to do so.  The raising of the residential requirement from one year to 7 years, however, is, in my judgment, unconstitutional for the reasons which I have given.  I would allow this appeal to declare that rise unconstitutional.
187. As to costs, I would order legal taxation of Madam Kong’s own costs.  I would make an order nisi awarding her costs here and in the courts below, such order to become absolute 21 days after the handing down of judgment in this appeal unless an application has been made to vary that order. And I would direct that in the event of such an application, costs he dealt with on written submissions lodged according to a time-table for which the parties, if not agreed thereon, should seek procedural directions from the Registrar.
188. I end by thanking both legal teams for the excellent arguments prepared and presented.

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers NPJ :
189. I agree with the judgment of Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ.
Chief Justice Ma :
190. By a unanimous decision, this appeal is allowed.  The Court also makes the declaration referred to in paragraph 144 above and makes the orders as to costs set out in paragraph 145 above.


(Geoffrey Ma) (RAV Ribeiro) (Robert Tang)
Chief Justice Permanent Judge Permanent Judge

(Kemal Bokhary) (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers)
Non-Permanent Judge Non-Permanent Judge

Mr Johannes Chan SC and Mr Hectar Pun instructed by Tang, Wong & Chow and assigned by the Legal Aid Department, for the Appellant
Lord Pannick QC and Mr Abraham Chan instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Respondent


[1]   She was duly issued with a Hong Kong Identity Card on 28 December 2005.
[2]   All set out in Section D of this judgment.
[3]   [2009] 4 HKLRD 382.
[4]   Stock VP, Lam and Barma JJ, cacv 185/2009 (17 February 2012).
[5]   Legco Brief, 3 June 2003, HWF CR/3/4821/99(03) Pt 7, §3.
[6]   Ibid, Annex C, §1.
[7]   Principal Assistant Secretary for Labour and Welfare (Welfare) 4 of the Labour and Welfare Bureau, Affirmation 8 January 2009 (“Mr Cheung’s Affirmation”), §16.
[8]   Legco Brief, 3 June 2003, Annex C, §5.
[9]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §41.
[10]   Ibid, §23.
[11]   Ibid, §24.
[12]   XCC (70) 14, For discussion on 17 March 1970.
[13]   Exco Memo, 11 March 1970, §7.
[14]   Principal Assistant Secretary for Labour and Welfare (Welfare) 4 of the Labour and Welfare Bureau, Affirmation 19 January 2011 (“Ms Choy’s Affirmation”), §12.
[15]   Reflecting Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
[16]   With Mr Hectar Pun.
[17]   With Social Security Allowance or “SSA” which provides largely non-means-tested allowances for the severely disabled and the elderly: Mr Cheung’s Affirmation §7(b).
[18]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §7.
[19]   Court of Appeal §50 and §69.
[20]   Court of Appeal §53.
[21]   Court of Appeal §§55-60.
[22]   Court of Appeal §§61-65.
[23]   Court of Appeal §68.
[24]   Court of Appeal §72.
[25]   Ibid.
[26]   In Section E.1.
[27]   With Mr Abraham Chan.
[28]   Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security FACV 15/2011 (21 December 2012), involving for example, the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
[29]   See for instance Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong v Secretary for Justice (2011) 14 HKCFAR 754 at §65-§66.
[30]   See for example, HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574 at §§36-44 on how the proportionality test operates.
[31]   As in Leung Kwok Hung v HKSAR (2005) 8 HKCFAR 229.
[32]     As in HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 574; and HKSAR v Ng Po On (2008) 11 HKCFAR 91.
[33]   As in Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 335 at §§19-22; Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at §§77-78.
[34]   (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at §66.
[35]   Ibid at §§71 and 76.
[36]   The Strasbourg and United Kingdom case-law is reviewed in Humphreys v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] 1 WLR 1545 at §§16-22.
[37]   Fok Chun Wa v Hospital Authority (2012) 15 HKCFAR 409 at §63.
[38]   Ibid at §72.
[39]   I have eliminated the words “and have resided in Hong Kong continuously for at least one year immediately before the date of application (absence from Hong Kong up to a maximum of 56 days during the one-year period is treated as residents in Hong Kong)” from the Order since the constitutionality of that additional requirement was successfully challenged and not made the subject of an appeal by the Director: see Yao Man Fai George v The Director of Social Welfare CACV 153/2010 (17 February 2012) decided simultaneously with the present case by the Court of Appeal.
[40]   The words in square brackets replace wording which had also referred to the condition of residence one year immediately before application.
[41]   Provided that the adult residents had been here for at least one year.
[42]   In Section L.4 below.
[43]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §45.  It was endorsed by Finance Committee on 27 June 2003: Ms Choy’s Affirmation, §39.
[44]   LC Paper No CB(2)1616/03-04(02), §11.  Repeated in LC Paper No CB(2)1616/03-04(03), §2.
[45]   Judgment §123.
[46]   Court of Appeal §108.
[47]   At §§52-54.
[48]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §55.
[49]   In Sections K and L below.
[50]   At §§3.25 and 3.26.
[51]   Children issued with a Certificate of Entitlement showing that they are in principle entitled to right of abode and the status of a Hong Kong permanent resident.
[52]   At §2.17.
[53]   Ibid.
[54]   It had been 75 in 1982, 105 in 1993 and became 150 in 1995.
[55]   Task Force Report, Summary of Recommendations, §8.
[56]   Ibid, §9.
[57]   Task Force Report, §2.21
[58]   LC Paper No CB(2)1401/03-03(03), §24.
[59]   Ibid.
[60]   At §2.27.
[61]   Minutes Welfare Panel Meeting on 10 March 2003, LC Paper No CB(2)1738/02-03, §13.
[62]   At p ix.
[63]   In Section L.3 below.
[64]   Minutes Welfare Panel Meeting on 10 March 2003, LC Paper No CB(2)1738/02-03, §14.
[65]   LC Paper No CB(2)871/07-08, 23 January 2008.
[66]   Task Force Report, Summary of Recommendations, §§4 and 5.
[67]   At §§3.6 and 3.7.
[68]   Task Force Report §2.17.
[69]   Task Force Report §5.3.
[70]   At §5.4.
[71]   Of 69,345 new arrival CSSA recipients as at the end of December 2002, 6.8% were aged 60 and above: Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §53.
[72]   LC Paper No CB(2)1401/02-03(03), §28 for discussion 10 March 2003. It is paid to persons aged 65 – 69 subject to a means test, and to persons aged 70 and above without means testing. Legco Brief HWF CR/3/4821/99(03) Pt 7, §6.
[73]   Executive Summary, §3.
[74]   Executive Summary, §§4 and 5.
[75]   Report, §47.
[76]   Report §49.
[77]   Executive Summary, §22.
[78]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §40; Legco Brief HWF CR 2/4821/58 (03) Pt 68, §11, 25 February 2003.
[79]   Legco Brief HWF CR 2/4821/58 (03) Pt 68, 25 February 2003, §1.
[80]   Ibid, §2.
[81]   Ibid, §5.
[82]   Social Security Assistance Index of Prices.
[83]   Legco Brief HWF CR 2/4821/58 (03) Pt 68, §4, 25 February 2003.
[84]   Ibid, §6.
[85]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §8 and §9.
[86]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §53.
[87]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §58.
[88]   Minutes of Welfare Panel meeting on 10 March 2003, LC Paper No CB(2)1738/02-03, §7.
[89]   LC Paper No CB(2)1401/02-03(03), for discussion 10 March 2003, Tables 1 and 4.
[90]   In Section F of this judgment.
[91]   LC Paper No CB(2)834/03-04(02)(Revised), §§8-9.
[92]   At  §5.55.
[93]   Task Force Report, §5.56.
[94]   Adopted by Mr Cheung in his Affirmation at §55.
[95]   Basic Law Article 26.
[96]   Basic Law Article 44.
[97]   Basic Law Article 55.
[98]   Basic Law Article 67.
[99]   Task Force Report §5.56, adopted in Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §55.
[100]   LC Paper No CB(2)1401/02-03(03), §24 for discussion 10 March 2003.
[101]   Section J.1 above.
[102]   December 1998 Report at §48.
[103]   At §§55 and 56.
[104]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §55.
[105]   Available online at http://www.try.gov.hk/internet/eharch_annual.html.
[106]   Comprising taxes, rates and duties; rental income; fees and charges; utilities; royalties and concessions; and other operating revenue.
[107]   The Exchange Fund’s results formed part of the category of non-operating revenue/expenses which also included capital expenses; land premia; net revenue from Home Ownership Scheme; interest and investment income; actuarial loss and curtailment loss on pensions; share of profits and losses of government business enterprises.
[108]   Comprising salaries, allowances and other employee benefits; recurrent subventions; social security payments; depreciation and other operating expenses.
[109]   Ms Choy’s Affirmation, §§40-45.
[110]   FCR (2003-04)33, for discussion on 27 June 2003, §17.
[111]   LC Paper No CB(2)1401/03-03(03) for discussion 10 March 2003, §27.
[112]   Minutes Welfare Panel Meeting on 10 March 2003, LC Paper No CB(2)1738/02-03, §14.
[113]   LC Paper No CB(2)1616/03-04(03), §17.
[114]   XCC (70) 14, For discussion on 17 March 1970, §5(f).
[115]   Mr Cheung’s Affirmation, §59.
[116]   Task Force Report, §5.57.
[117]   In the Social Security Manual of Procedures, paragraphs C52 and C53.
[118]   Failure to find or keep employment not usually being regarded as such.
[119]   In Section L.1 above.
[120]   She received $3,200 from the Rainbow Fund, $2,100 from the Apple Fund.
[121]   Set out in Section F above.